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ABSTRACT

Nevada's legal brothels offer a unique opportunity to
study the problem of defining commercial speech. Although
state law forbids advertisements of houses of prostitution
in counties where brothels themselves are against law,
brothel messages are abundant in Clark County, where any
form of prostitution is illegal. The publishers of these
messages claim they are constitutionally protected edito
rial speech rather than advertisements which enjoy little
or no First Amendment protection, thus confounding the
efforts of prosecutors who say they would otherwise move
to remove such messages from public display.
The thesis examines the development of the U.S.
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine and those defi
nitions of commercial speech which have been suggested by
jurists and scholars. The limitations of these definitions
are illustrated by applying them to the Nevada brothel
messages.
Finally, a heuristic definition of commercial speech,
based on the Masses standard currently used in adjudicat
ing sedition cases is suggested. The position is taken
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that the line between commercial and non-commercial speech
is the line between abstract economic discussion and
incitement to a specific economic transaction. The
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed definition are
also illustrated by applying it to the brothel messages.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"[I]n a sense, advertising is the pornography of
capitalism, intended to arouse desire for objects
rather than for persons." (Farber 383-384)

Erotica has long been used by advertisers as a sales
tool without raising constitutional concerns. But when it
is sex itself that is for sale, in the case of legalized
Nevada prostitution, the issue of whether or not brothel
messages can be disseminated raises interesting First
Amendment concerns in the area of commercial speech.
Brothel prostitution is allowed by Nevada law in all but
two of the state's 17 counties (NRS 244.345; see Appendix
A). Advertising these houses of "ill fame or repute," as
they are referred to in the law, is similarly prohibited
in the two counties, Clark and Washoe, which contain the
state's two largest cities, Las Vegas and Reno. Nevada
Revised Statute 201.430 makes brothel advertising a misde
meanor punishable by a $500 fine in those counties where
houses of prostitution are prohibited; the law defines
such advertising to include, "any display, handbill, pub-
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lication of address, location or telephone number of a
house of prostitution or of directions telling how to
obtain such information" (See Appendix B).
Despite the law, there appears to be an abundance of
brothel advertising in Las Vegas. Booklets and magazines
distributed free in newsracks in high tourist traffic
areas contain what appears, prima facie, to be advertis
ing. These flyers, found under a variety of names, com
monly contain maps giving directions to Nevada brothels,
telephone numbers of those businesses, references to
limousine service and other information in seeming viola
tion of state statute. Most of the flyers also describe
various brothels or offer comment on the role of prostitu
tion in American society. As AIDS has increasingly become
an issue of public concern, some of the messages claim
brothels offer safe sex.
While the content of the messages varies somewhat,
they all have one thing in common: all claim not to be
advertisements, but constitutionally-protected editorial
content, thus frustrating the efforts of county officials
who say they would otherwise act to stop publication. Mah
lon Edwards, the deputy district attorney in Clark County
whose duties include prosecution under statutes regulating
adult businesses, said the difficulty in drawing a legal
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
is at least one of the factors which keeps his office from
acting against the publishers of brothel messages
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(Edwards).
Edwards was not alone in his uncertainty. The line
between speech more fully protected by the First Amendment
and that which jurists and scholars have come to label
"commercial speech" has never been distinct. The U.S.
Supreme Court has evolved a complicated commercial speech
doctrine.

Nevertheless, as Rome and Roberts have pointed

out, "To date, the Supreme Court has failed to formulate a
precise definition of commercial speech" (108). While a
few scholars have attempted definitions, no one definition
seems adequate.

The purpose of this thesis is to investi

gate the difficulties of precisely defining commercial
speech by applying extant definitions to examples of con
temporary Nevada brothel messages. Then, a heuristic defi
nition of commercial speech based on the standards the
Court has come to apply to sedition cases is suggested.
Although this definition, too, has its shortcomings, it is
the position taken by this thesis that the definition is a
valuable starting point from which to begin further
research into the problem of defining commercial speech. A
more workable definition of commercial speech is important
because, without one, the status of more fully protected
speech is threatened. As Simon has noted:
The lack of a workable definition presents serious
questions about First Amendment theory and its appli
cation . . . Many in the legal community are con
cerned that diminished protection may spread from
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commercial speech to "core" speech like an infectious
disease. There is evidence in a number of cases that
this fear is reasonable (216-218).
Despite the importance of clear definitions, the prob
lem of distinguishing commercial from non-commercial
speech has received scant attention. As Simon pointed out,
"Both the Supreme Court and its critics have been rela
tively unconcerned with the problem of defining commercial
speech. Rather, discussion has mainly concerned the analy
sis of the actual and proposed tests used in deciding dis
putes" (219).
That does not mean that the definitional issue has
been ignored. But neither scholars nor jurists have yet
isolated a definition which is without significant prob
lems. Justice William Brennan put the problem succinctly
in his concurring opinion in Metromedia Inc. v. Citv of
San Dieao;
I would be unhappy to see city officials dealing with
the following series of billboards and deciding which
ones to permit: the first billboard contains the mes
sage, "Visit Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe"; the second,
"Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe uses only the highest quality
dairy products"; the third, "because Joe thinks that
dairy products are good for you, please shop at Joe's
Shoppe"; and the fourth, "Joe says to support dairy
price supports: they mean lower prices for you at his
Shoppe." (538)

This thesis will suggest means, grounded in wellaccepted constitutional principles, by which to begin to
make such determinations. But rather than deal in hypoth
etical examples, it will utilize Nevada brothel messages
as real instances on which to test theoretical definitions
of commercial speech. By focusing these definitions on
Nevada brothel messages, the workability of each defini
tion should become apparent.
Nevada brothel messages are a particularly well-suited
locus from which to examine the definitional problems sur
rounding the commercial speech doctrine. In addition to
ensuring definitions that are applicable to actual situa
tions, the brothel messages themselves contain what
appears to be a mixture of commercial and non-commercial
elements. Such mixed messages have seemed especially dif
ficult to deal with in definitional terms, as will be seen
in subsequent chapters.
Also significant is that legal prostitution is an on
going political issue in Nevada, both because of its eco
nomic importance to some of the smaller counties and
because of the public health issues it raises in an AIDS
conscious era. A focus on brothel advertising also serves
as a reminder that messages which raise genuine political
concerns are not always those which one would intuitively
categorize as fundamental to the First Amendment. Legiti
mate political controversy can just as easily center on
images which, as Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, "few of
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us would inarch our sons and daughters off to war to pre
serve the citizen's right to see" (Young v. American Mini
Theaters. Inc. 70).
By applying abstract definitions to actual examples,
one also avoids the danger of overemphasizing hypothetical
concerns at the expense of sound theory.

Simon has writ

ten that, "[l]aw reviews have featured abundant materials
on commercial speech. Few, however, have sought a defini
tion precise enough to be useful in deciding cases .

.

As a result, theoretical speculation has prevailed over
application" (229-230). Pritchard has criticized much
media law research

for its institutional emphasis and its

focus on precedent and the "correctness" of court deci
sions. This institutional paradigm is fine, Pritchard
said, for "the study of philosophy or moral principles,"
(56), but it is also limiting. To cite Friedman and Macau
lay: "To make formal rules and formal institutions the
center of attention, and to ignore the way events, values
and people affect them would distort the picture badly"
(32). Focus on extant brothel messages will offer insight
into the actual ways in which communicators confront the
commercial contours of First Amendment theory.
Before addressing in detail the definitional issues at
the heart of this thesis, some theoretical background is
needed. In Chapter Two, the evolution of current commer
cial speech doctrine, as articulated in the relevant deci
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court, is traced.

Then, the
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philosophical assumptions which inform the various posi
tions the Court has taken with regards to First Amendment
protection for commercial speech are discussed in Chapter
Three. Contemporary Nevada brothel messages and their
relationship with changes in state law are examined in
Chapter Four. Those definitions that have been suggested
by jurists and scholars are applied in Chapter Five to the
brothel messages. The various definitional approaches are
evaluated, with the advantages of and problems with each
discussed. Finally, in Chapter Six, the problem of distin
guishing commercial from non-commercial speech is analog
ized to the Masses standard suggested by Judge Learned
Hand: That the court recognize a difference between
abstract speech and advocacy of specific acts. It is
argued that if this standard works in the political
sphere, it ought to be equally useful in the economic mar
ketplace.

Hard cases will no doubt remain. But this

should not dissuade us from moving in the direction of
greater definitional precision, if only to understand the
limitations of any such attempt. Laurence Tribe has
observed:
That there are and will remain hard cases —

is the

coal company's ad proclaiming its concern for the
environment and warning of the hazards of nuclear
fuel commercial speech or political expression? —
an insufficient reason either to return to the
unprincipled extreme of excluding all commercial

is

speech from

First Amendment protection or to embrace

the equally

indefensible position that government

cannot stop

someone from selling 7-Up claiming it to

be insulin.

(895)

Tribe's observation points out two widely disparate
views of the proper position of commercial speech in the
scheme of the First Amendment. It is this author's hope
that the definition to be proposed in this thesis is one
that will be useful to students of the First Amendment,
however their views diverge.

In the final analysis, fos

tering agreement between scholars with significantly div
ergent political and legal philosophies by approaching
definitional issues from a principled perspective all can
agree with is the highest aspiration of this inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

It will be helpful to examine the commercial speech
doctrine in general before focusing on definitional
issues.

This chapter traces the development of commercial

speech case law from its roots in the so-called "Jehovah's
Witnesses" cases of the 1930s, through the 1970s when com
mercial expression enjoyed expanded protection, to the
late 1980s in which the protection enjoyed by such speech
is again being curtailed.
Commercial speech —

which we might informally define

as advertising or other commercial solicitation, until we
can formulate a more precise definition later on —

occu

pies a place unique in the scheme of ordered First Amend
ment liberties. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that certain types of speech are beyond the protection of
the Constitution, commercial speech is neither protected
at the same level as political speech, nor fully outside
the ambit of the First Amendment.
It is a well-established principle that the First
Amendment's proscription of laws "abridging" freedom of
speech is not absolute. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942):
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There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitu
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words —

those which by their very utter

ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposi
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter
est in order and morality.

(571-572).

In addition to the above-cited categories of speech,
the advocacy of imminent illegal activity has also been
held

undeserving of constitutional protection (Brandenburg

v.Oh i o . 1969). Purely commercial

advertising, too, was

at first held to be outside the protection of the First
Amendment when the Court considered the issue of advertis
ing and free speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen. decided
the same year as Chaplinskv.
Valentine, like Chaplinskv. is one of the so-called
"Jehovah's Witnesses cases" the Court heard in the 1930s
and 1940s. Although Valentine is generally considered the
first commercial speech case, Rome and Roberts have cor
rectly pointed out that "[t]he Court's holding in Valen
tine v. Chrestensen was not the inexplicable appearance of
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a new rule and is properly viewed in its context with a
number of prior decisions" (11).
These prior decisions include two cases significant to
our inquiry: Lovell v. Griffin. Georgia (1938) and
Schneider v. State of New Jersey. Town of Irvington.
(1939). Both cases involved the dissemination of litera
ture and alleged commercial solicitation by Jehovah's Wit
nesses .
In Love l l . the Court unanimously struck down a Georgia
municipal ordinance which prohibited the distribution of
"handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind" with
out a permit (447). The Court invalidated the ordinance on
free speech grounds, holding that pamphlets were entitled
to the same level of constitutional protection as were
more traditional forms of the press, without addressing
either the potential freedom of religion issue, or the
commercial aspects of soliciting funds in return for reli
gious tracts.
The following year, the Court decided Schneider and
three companion cases, this time, in dicta. addressing the
commercial aspects of the speech involved. In Schneider,
the Court reversed the conviction of Clara Schneider, a
Jehovah's Witness who was distributing religious litera
ture door-to-door as well as seeking contributions to the
sect. In Young v. California, city of Los Angeles,
handbills advertised a meeting of the "Friends of the Lin
coln Brigade," a gathering at which speakers would discuss
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the Spanish Civil War. Admission was to be charged.
Nichols v. Massachusetts. City of Worcester and Snyder v.
Milwaukee involved leaflets advertising a meeting protest
ing unemployment insurance administration and labor pick
eting, respectively.
Of the four cases, Schneider and Young directly
involved the economic interests of the speaker, Schneider
through direct solicitation, Young because of the admis
sion charge for attending the meeting.

The economic

interest of petitioners was also a factor in the other two
cases, albeit indirectly, since it cannot be denied that
the financial well-being of picketers and those protesting
unemployment insurance policies might be affected by the
actions the speakers sought to protest.
The significance of economic motivation in distin
guishing commercial from non-commercial speech will be
discussed later. For now, it is sufficient to note that in
all these pre-Valentine cases, the Court recognized a
distinction between purely commercial activity and solici
tation or advertising which was related to an activity
which itself was constitutionally protected. In cases
involving protected activity, the Court held that speech
related to such endeavors, although otherwise possibly
commercial, would be similarly protected.

The Commercial Speech Exception
Valentine was the case in which the commercial speech
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doctrine went beyond dicta. Although the Supreme Court
treated the case as one involving "purely commercial
advertising" (54), Valentine involved what might be termed
"mixed speech," communication containing both commercial
and political elements. The brothel messages examined in
Chapter Four are much the same sort of "mixed speech."
Valentine. then, deserves to be examined in detail, not so
much because it is traditionally regarded as the seminal
commercial speech case, but because of the similarity of
the underlying communication to the brothel messages at
the locus of our inquiry.
In 1940, F.J. Chrestensen, the owner of a former U.S.
Navy submarine which he advertised in handbills as a
"$2,000,000 fighting monster," applied for but was refused
permission to dock and exhibit his vessel at New York
City-owned docks at Battery Park. Chrestensen subsequently
secured permission to conduct his submarine tour off a
state-owned pier on the East River. He sought to advertise
the exhibit through the use of handbills which depicted a
cutaway diagram of the vessel and included the statement
that guides would take sightseers on a tour of the subma
rine's various compartments.

"See how men live in a Hell

Diver," the handbill stated. The handbill quoted admission
prices of $.25 for adults and $.15 for children (Chresten
sen 522) .
Chrestensen was informed that his advertisement would
be illegal under a New York statute which prohibited
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purely commercial handbills, but expressly allowed leaf
lets advertising public protests.

(New York City Sanitary

Code, Health Department Regulations, Art. Ill, sec. 318.)
Chrestensen revised his handbill in an attempt to conform
to the law, removing all reference to the sale of tickets,
or the price thereof, but retaining a map showing how to
reach the submarine exhibit.
According to the federal appellate court which ruled
in Chrestensen's favor:
In place of the schedule of prices appeared the
statement, "The only submarine used for exhibition in
the world"; instead of the insistent commands to
"see" the described points of interests were only the
drab statements that "Submarine S-49 contains" the
torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters, the
kitchen, etc.; and the invitation to see life in a
hell diver vanished completely.

(512)

The other side of the brochure displayed four para
graphs of closely-spaced type under the headline, "Subma
rine Refused Permission To Dock At Any City Owned Pier By
Commissioner Of Docks McKenzie." The paragraphs protested
against the "almost unbelievable" action of the "dictato
rial" subordinates of "a mayor who is one of the outstand
ing liberals of the United States" by refusing Chrestensen
permission to dock at the city-owned piers. The protest
concluded that "while not as convenient for the visitors
of Battery Park, by following the diagram on the other
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side of this paper, it may be reached in about two (2)
minutes"

(Chrestensen v. Valentine 512).

Chrestensen was subsequently informed his revised
handbill would also be illegal because of the information
of a commercial nature on its face, but that he could dis
tribute a flyer with only the information contained on the
back of the handbill without interference.
Judge William Clark, writing for a majority of the
appellate court, upheld a federal district court ruling
that the New York City ordinance was unconstitutional as
applied. Clark wrote that "Absolute prohibition of expres
sion 'in the marketplace' is illegal, not to be saved by
any commercial taint attached to the expression.

. . . And

borderline cases are to be resolved, not in favor of the
regulation, but in favor of the cherished right" (515).
Nonetheless, Clark's decision was overturned by a
unanimous Supreme Court in the terse Valentine decision.
Rather than follow Clark's admonition that borderline
cases be resolved "in favor of the cherished right," the
Court simply dismissed Chrestensen's protest as subter
fuge, saying it had been written "with the intent and pur
pose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance" (ValentjjQS 55) .

The Exception's Gradual Demise
If Valentine v. Chrestensen were still good law, this
inquiry into the definitional problems surrounding the

16

commercial speech doctrine might seem unnecessary, or at
best purely academic. But the Court's ipse dixit approach
to mixed speech has fared no better than the Valentine
decision itself.
For a short time, it appeared the Court would broaden
the new commercial speech doctrine and reach decisions
incompatible with those announced in the pre-Valentine
Jehovah's Witnesses cases discussed above. As "local
authorities attempting to suppress the activities of the
Witnesses tried to capitalize on the commercial speech
exception . . . announced in Valentine." another group of
cases soon reached the Court (Rome and Roberts 21). Since
proselytization by Witnesses involved solicitation for
funds to offset the cost of literature, prosecutors argued
that the profit motive involved meant the resulting commu
nication was commercial speech, unprotected by the First
Amendment.
At first, the Court seemed to agree. In Jones v.
Opelika. Kansas (1942) and several companion cases, the
convictions of sect members were upheld. Justice Stanley
Reed, writing for the 5-4 Court majority, argued that
restrictions on solicitation were simply nondiscriminatory "time, place and manner regulations" (594)
which dealt only with commercial transactions "incidental
to the exercise of religion or the freedom of speech or
the press" (596). Citing Valentine, the Court noted,
" [C]ommercial advertising cannot escape control by the
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simple expedient of printing matter in the public interest
on the same sheet or handbill'1 (597).
In its initial Jones decision, the Court held that it
made no difference that solicitation for funds played only
a minor role in sect activities. Reed concluded that "to
subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable
fee for their money-making activities does not require a
finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It
is enough that money is earned by the sale of articles"
(596).
The following year, the Court decided Jamison v. Texas
(1943). Jamison, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of
violating an anti-handbill ordinance. The leaflets Jamison
distributed announced a religious revival meeting on one
side and on the other advertised that two books were
available for $.25 to cover postage. The Court distin
guished the case from Valentine, deciding that the motive
in the Jamison case was to raise funds for religious pur
poses rather than the acquisition of personal profit
(417). Again, the Court looked to the activity underlying
what might otherwise be considered commercial speech. Fol
lowing Jamison. the Court reheard and vacated Jones and
its companions, on the like reasoning that the solicita
tion was religious in nature rather than purely commer
cial.

(319 US 105). The same year, the Court decided Mur

dock v. Pennsylvania. a similar Jehovah's Witness case, in
which it went beyond the protection of religion, noting,
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in dic t a f that " [t]he right to use the press for express
ing one's views is not to be measured by the protection
afforded commercial handbills"

(111).

The distinction between protected religious or politi
cal canvassing and unprotected commercial solicitation was
further sharpened in Breard v. City of Alexandria (1951).
In Breard. the Court upheld the conviction of a door-todoor seller of secular magazines. The case seemed on its
face similar to those immediately preceding it, in that
its outcome hinged on the motive of the speaker. As Rome
and Roberts note, the case,

"appears to hold that the

profit motive in selling the magazines is sufficient to
deprive the door-to-door solicitation of magazine sub
scriptions of the protection of the First Amendment" (33).
However, a closer look at Breard reveals that the
Court had moved away significantly from Valentine's abso
lute denial of constitutional protection for commercial
speech. Instead, in Breard. the Court balanced competing
interests, acknowledging a conflict between "the pub
lisher's right to distribute publications in the precise
way that those soliciting for him think brings the best
results," and "some householders' desire for privacy"
(Breard 644).
By 1959, Justice Douglas had observed that the Valen
tine ruling "has not survived reflection" (Cammarano v.
United States 514). But the exception of commercial speech
from constitutional protection continued, if in name only,
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until 1976, with the decision in Virginia Board of Phar
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The interven
ing years saw the gradual demise of the commercial speech
exception, as individual cases were distinguished from
Valentine.
Following Breardf the Court next addressed the commer
cial speech exception, albeit cursorily, in New York Times
v. Sullivan (1964).

Sullivan. more rightly viewed as a

landmark case in the area of libel and defamation law,
need not be discussed at length here. It will suffice to
note that the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
because allegedly libelous statements were part of a paid
advertisement, they were not entitled to constitutional
protection. Justice William Brennan noted that the adver
tisement "communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern" (376 U.S. at 266). To deny constitutional
protection to such editorial advertisements, Brennan's
opinion held, would "shackle the First Amendment in its
attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" (266).
This distinction between purely commercial advertis
ing, on the one hand, and advertising involving issues of
public concern on the other, was further refined in Pitts
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela
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tions . (1973).

The case involved the categorizing of

classified advertisements in a daily newspaper under the
headings "Male Help Wanted" and "Female Help Wanted."
Appellants argued that such categories facilitated illegal
sex discrimination in employment.
The Court viewed its task in Pittsburgh Press as
deciding whether the advertisements more resembled the
public interest editorial advertisement in Sullivan or the
purely commercial speech of Valentine (413 U.S. 385).

The

Court had no difficulty deciding that " [i]n the crucial
respects, the advertisements in the present record
resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan adver
tisement" (385).
The Court also dealt with Pittsburgh Press's argument
that such restrictions interfered with the editorial dis
cretion of a newspaper and that "if this package of adver
tisement' and placement is commercial speech, then commer
cial speech should be accorded a higher level of protec
tion than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest."
(388).

Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion replied

that:
Discrimination in employment is not only commercial
activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the
Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper consti
tutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad
proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prosti
tutes. Nor would the result be different if the
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nature of the transaction were indicated by placement
under columns captioned "Narcotics for Sale" and
"Prostitutes Wanted" rather than stated within the
four corners of the advertisement.

(388)

In an attempt to distinguish the legal difference (if
not the substantive distinction) between permissible and
non-permissible commercial speech, the Court went on to
note that:
We emphasize that nothing in our holding allows gov
ernment at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to
publish and distribute advertisements commenting on
the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Com
mission, or the propriety of sex preferences in
employment. Nor, a fortiori. does our decision autho
rize any restriction whatever, whether of content or
layout, on stories or commentary originated by Pitts
burgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On
the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protec
tion afforded to editorial judgment and to the free
expression of views on these and other issues, how
ever controversial (391).
The Court thus recognized a legal difference not only
between commercial and non-commercial speech, but a dif
ference in the level of protection to be afforded adver
tisements, depending on their level of "public interest."
This underlines the need to distinguish between these
types of communication. As previously noted, attempts to
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define commercial speech will be the focus of Chapter Four
and need not be discussed in detail here. But it should be
pointed out that the 5-4 Pittsburgh Press decision con
cerned the dissenters because of the definitional issues
it seemed to raise but not answer.

Chief Justice Warren

Burger thought the decision represented "a disturbing
enlargement of the 'commercial speech' doctrine" which
would launch the courts on "a treacherous path of defining
what layout and organizational decisions of newspapers are
'sufficiently associated' with the 'commercial' parts of
the papers as to be constitutionally unprotected and
therefore subject to governmental regulation" (293). Jus
tice Potter Stewart was concerned that Pittsburgh Press
was "the first case in this or any other American court
that permits a government agency to enter a composing room
of a

newspaper and dictate to the publisher the layout

and

makeup of the newspaper's pages" (402).
Justice Douglas agreed, again explicitly repudiating
his vote in the unanimous Valentine decision. He wrote
that:
I believe that commercial materials also have First
Amendment protection. If Empire Industries Ltd.

.

wanted to run full-page advertisements denouncing

. .
or

criticizing this Pennsylvania law, I see no way in
which Pittsburgh Press could be censored or punished
for running the ad, any more than a person could be
punished for uttering the contents of the ad in a
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public address at Independence Hall.

(398)

Pittsburgh Press is not the only time the Court was
able to avoid difficult commercial speech issues by rely
ing on the legal status of the conduct underlying the
speech.

The changing legal status of abortion in 1973

also allowed the Court to decide a difficult case by look
ing at the conduct which the commercial speech was about.
In Bigelow v. Virginia r (1973), however, the Court decided
in favor of the commercial speech in question. Bigelow was
the managing editor of an "underground" newspaper at the
University of Virginia that accepted an advertisement
announcing the availability of legal abortions in New
York. He was charged with violating a Virginia criminal
statute making it unlawful to "encourage or promote the
procuring of abortion or miscarriage," in any publication,
lecture or advertisement.

(421 US at 813.) The Virginia

Supreme Court, relying on Valentine. rejected Bigelow's
appeal in 1972.
During the pendency of Bigelow's appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Court decided Roe v. W a d e . (1973),
outlawing state control of abortion in the first trimes
ter, and remanded Bigelow to the state court. The Virginia
court again decided against the plaintiff.
The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975,
and the conviction was overturned at least in part because
the commercial speech involved dealt with the constitu
tional considerations in Roe and Doe v. Bolton. (1973).
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But the Court went further. Justice Harry Blackmun, for
the Court, stated that "Virginia is really asserting an
interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read
about the New York services." (827-828) In addition,
Blackmun argued, the Bigelow advertisement:
conveyed information of potential interest and value
to a diverse audience —

not only to readers possibly

in need of the services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or general interest
in, the subject matter . . . and to readers seeking
reform in Virginia.

(811)

The Court distinguished Bigelow from Valentine.
calling the latter's holding "distinctly a limited one"
(819), somewhat unconvincingly perhaps, in light of the
earlier case's sweeping language.
A year later, the Court stopped distinguishing indi
vidual cases, and explicitly overturned Valentine in
Virginia state Board of Pharmacy. In BQar<3 Of. pharmacy,
the Court dealt with the purely commercial advertising of
drug prices. A consumer group challenged Virginia law pro
hibiting the advertisement of drug prices, giving the
Court the opportunity to deal squarely with the commercial
speech exception.
As Justice Blackmun's opinion in the Board of Pharmacy
case pointed out:
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any
subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He
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does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy
fact or to make generalized observations even about
commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communi
cate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescrip
tion drug at the Y price." (761)
In striking down the Virginia law, the Court looked
not at the constitutional interests of advertisers, but to
the First Amendment rights of the receivers of informa
tion. Citing Lamont v. Postmaster General. (1965) and
Procunier v. Martinez. (1974), the Court held that "where
a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients" (756). Thus, the Court considered the individ
ual consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information. "[T]hat interest may be as keen, if not
keener, by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate," Justice Blackmun observed (763).
Moreover, in a free market economy, commercial infor
mation was vital to informed decision-making, the Court
noted. The state's position that allowing advertising
might harm the professionalism of pharmacists was rejected
as "highly paternalistic" (770). Blackmun argued that the
idea behind the First Amendment was to provide people with
more, not less communication, and that closing channels of
communication was not the best way to serve the public
interest.
The Court also acknowledged the potential definitional
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difficulties inherent in a continued commercial speech
exception. Blackmun commented that "no line between pub
licly 'interesting7 or 'important7 commercial advertising
and the opposite kind could ever be drawn," (765) and went
on to observe:
Our pharmacist could cast himself as a commentator on
store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his
own and those of a competitor as proof. We see little
point in requiring him to do so, and little differ
ence if he does not.

(765)

Retrenchment
Perhaps because of the sweeping language of Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, as well as the fact that the next few
commercial speech decisions relied on its holding and
d i c t a . there has been a tendency on the part of some
commentators to view the commercial speech exception as,
with few exceptions, moribund. Overbeck and Pullen view
the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case as the most important
modern commercial speech decision, with subsequent cases
expanding First Amendment protection for commercial and
corporate speech.

(283-288) Cohen and Kaplan take a simi

lar position, casting the Virginia decision as the central
case, and the subsequent holdings as either expanding pro
tection or narrowly defining exceptions to this new, antipaternal doctrine.

(194-205)

To be sure, in 1977, the Court relied on Virginia
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Board of Pharmacy to declare unconstitutional an ordinance
outlawing truthful "for sale" and "sold" signs in residen
tial areas in Linmark Associates v. Willinaboro. And the
following year, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court ruled that in commercial speech cases the
state must meet the same exacting standards —

a compel

ling interest and closely drawn means — which apply to
"core" First Amendment speech.
In addition, a series of attorney advertising cases
extended, within limitations, First Amendment protection
to at least some forms of lawyer advertising. In Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona (1977), the Court cited the potential
interest to listeners in upholding a legal clinic's right
to advertise "legal service at reasonable prices."
Although in-person solicitation is distinguished from pro
tected commercial speech in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
(1978), protection was extended to a lawyer's newspaper
advertisement aimed at potential product liability plain
tiffs in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(1985).
It must be emphasized, however, that although Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy overturned Valentine, it did not
elevate commercial speech to the status of other communi
cation protected by the First Amendment. The limited ques
tion in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, as phrased by Black
mun, was whether the state could completely suppress
truthful information about lawful activity. In Bates. the

28

Court put it even more succinctly, noting in dicta that
"advertising that is false, deceptive or misleading . . .
is subject to restraint,"

(384) and that "advertising con

cerning transactions that are themselves illegal obviously
may be suppressed" (384).
The notion that communication must be truthful is for
eign to the rest of the First Amendment. As Justice Powell
wrote for the majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc . .
(1974), "Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction, not on the conscience of
judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas"
(339). As shall be seen in Chapter Three, the justifica
tion for this lower level of protection —

that commercial

speech is somehow hardier and more verifiable than other
types of speech —

is open to debate. In fact, the Court

itself has admitted on one occasion that commercial infor
mation is not always subject to verification.

('National

Commission on Egg Nutrition v. F T C ) In addition, the
advocacy of illegal activity is not always unprotected.
While incitement to specific illegal acts has been held to
be outside the protection of the First Amendment, the
Court has held that the advocacy of such activity in the
abstract cannot be proscribed (Brandenburg).
The post-Virainia Board of Pharmacy cases also distin
guish protection afforded commercial speech from that to
which core speech is entitled in another important
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respect.

In Bates. the Court observed that "since adver

tising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems
unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to
being crushed by overbroad legislation" (380). And in
Qhralik, the Court went even further, warning that the
commonsense distinctions between commercial and non
commercial speech might "invite dilution, simply by a lev
elling process" of the latter (455). Therefore, the Court
would grant " [c]ommercial speech a limited measure of pro
tection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
non-commercial expression" (455). Thus, the stage was set
for the Court to retrench and reformulate the commercial
speech doctrine.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission has been called a case that "expanded the First
Amendment protection of corporate speech" (Overbeck and
Pullen 287), perhaps because the Court decided in favor of
the communication involved. But in the course of deciding
Central H u d s o n , the Court undertook an entire restatement
of the commercial speech doctrine, a restatement which
explicitly reaffirmed and institutionalized the limits on
commercial speech freedom begun in the three abovementioned attorney advertising cases. Because of its tre
mendous importance in articulating current doctrine, Cen
tral Hudson will be closely examined.

In Central Hudson, the Court declared unconstitutional
a New York Public Service Commission order banning adver
tising by electric utilities promoting the use of energy
as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although the Court recognized the state's legitimate
interest in promoting the conservation of energy, the Pub
lic Service Commission's order was struck down on the nar
row ground that the regulation was more extensive than
necessary, since it might apply equally to energyefficient electric devices as well as those in more common
use (580-581).
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell articulated a
four-part test to be used to determine when state regula
tion of commercial speech was allowable:
[W]e, must determine (1) whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it must (1A)
concern lawful activity and (IB) not be misleading.
Next, we ask (2) whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield pos
itive answers, we must determine (3) whether the reg
ulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and (4) whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.

(566)

The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the one
used to strike down the Public Service Commission order,
appears, prima facie. to be a restatement of the over-
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breadth doctrine. But Powell was quick to note that while
statutes regulating commercial speech must be narrowly
drawn, "[t]his analysis is not an application of the over
breadth doctrine" (565 at n. 8).
To understand this apparent contradiction, it is nec
essary to briefly review the overbreadth doctrine itself,
and attempt to distinguish between that doctrine and Cen
tral Hudson's fourth prong. This analysis will also be
helpful before attempting narrowly-tailored definitions of
commercial speech itself.
It is an accepted principle of First Amendment law
that statutes must be neither overbroad nor underinclusive. In other words, statutes, and the definitions on
which they rely, must be drawn narrowly enough to avoid
the risk they might be applied to otherwise protected
speech, on the theory that such imprecise definitions
might "chill" broad categories of speech. At the same
time, they must not be drawn so narrowly that they fail to
include speech that should be controlled if they are to
directly advance the state interests which inform them.
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. (1975), for
example, the Court overturned a city ordinance prohibiting
the showing of nudity in drive-ins and on other movie
screens visible from public streets. The Court held that
the law was overbroad in that it would "bar a film con
taining a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a
war victim or scenes from a culture where nudity is
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indigenous" (213). Here, the Court was relying on the phi
losophy expressed in Chaplinsky. where the majority held
that control of speech is permissible only in "narrowly
limited classes of speech" (571). The Jacksonville ordi
nance was unconstitutional also because it was underinclusive. Part of the rationale behind the law was that nudity
on drive-in screens was a hazard in that it might distract
drivers. But the Court majority replied that nudity was
being singled out and that other movies, such as those
depicting violence, might be equally distracting, yet were
permissible under the ordinance (215).
When applying the doctrine of overbreadth, courts are
generally not obliged to reach the question of whether the
speech in a given case

is itself protected. As a note in

the Harvard Law Review

has explained it: "Rather than

excise particular applications one by one as they arise,
the Court has employed the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine to short circuit the process by invalidating
statute and putting it
ing.

the

up to the legislature for redraft

(The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine 845).
The overbreadth doctrine gives litigants the power, as

the Court noted in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. (1973), to
"challenge a statute not because their own rights of free
expression are violated, but because of a judicial predic
tion or assumption that the statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from consti
tutionally protected speech or expression" (612).

33

If the Court were ever to declare the overbreadth doc
trine totally applicable in the commercial speech area, it
might permit an advertiser to challenge a state or federal
statute,

"even where the advertiser's communication in

question was false or misleading, or related to unlawful
activity, or was for some other reason unprotected" (Rome
and Roberts 151).
The distinction between the overbreadth doctrine and
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, then, is that
courts must reach the question in commercial speech cases
of whether or not the specific communication involved is
constitutionally protected. The Court's refusal to apply
the overbreadth doctrine in its entirety to the commercial
speech area, other than to require statutes to be "nar
rowly drawn," stems from its belief implied in Bates. that
commercial speech is somehow "hardier" speech than other
communication deserving constitutional protection.
The Court, in the first prong of the Central Hudson
test, also reinforced the notion that protected commercial
speech not be false or misleading, supplying the following
rationale: " [C]ommercial speakers have extensive knowledge
both of the market and their products. Thus, they are well
situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and
the lawfulness of the underlying activity" (564 at n.6).
Far from being an expansion of the rights afforded
commercial speakers, then, Central Hudson clearly repre
sents movement away from the expansive tone of Virginia
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Board of Pharmacy. To be sure, the Court in Central Hudson
recognized Board of Pharmacy/s rejection of paternalism;
it went even further, stating that "even when advertising
communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant
facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate
information is better than no information at all" 562).
But taken as a whole, Central Hudson cannot be viewed as a
victory for commercial speakers, particularly when its
progeny are examined.
Following Central Hudson, the Court had occasion to
again deal with what has been termed "mixed speech" in
Bolqer v. Younas Drug Products (1983). Here, for the first
time, the Court articulated criteria for dealing with such
speech.
The case involved the mailing of unsolicited flyers
promoting prophylactics and "discussing the desirability
of prophylactics in general and Youngs7 products in par
ticular" fBolqer 62). Because the Court ruled against the
Postal Service, holding that the information involved was
"relevant to important social issues such as family plan
ning and the prevention of venereal disease" (69), Bolqer
might appear to be a victory for commercial speech inter
ests.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, for the Court, stated that
taken by themselves, reference to a specific product, or
proposals to engage in a commercial transaction, or eco
nomic motivation, would not compel the conclusion that the
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pamphlets involved are commercial speech fBolder 66-67).
However, the existence of all three characteristics taken
together meant the communication in question was commer
cial .
Nonetheless, Marshall went on to say that:
[Advertising which "links a product to a current
public debate" is not thereby entitled to the consti
tutional protection afforded noncommercial speech . .
. A company has the full panoply of protections
available to its direct comments on public issues, so
there is no reason for providing similar constitu
tional protection when such statements are made in
the context of commercial transactions.

(68)

Thus, it would seem that otherwise protected speech
loses its protected status if it appears in a context the
Court decides is commercial.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in concurrence, worried
that Bolder might lead to just this sort of dilution:
[Advertisements may be a complex mixture of commer
cial and noncommercial elements: the noncommercial
message does not obviate the need for appropriate
commercial regulation . . . conversely, the commer
cial element does not necessarily provide a valid
basis for noncommercial censorship.

. . .

[ S i g n ificant speech so often comprises both commer
cial and noncommercial elements.

..."

(81-81)

If one adopts the view that recent commercial speech
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decisions have moved away from Board of Pharmacy, the
Court's most recent major encounter with advertising — Po
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of
Puerto Rico —

seems more a continuation of this reformu

lation than it does a dramatic turn-around, as it has been
viewed by some commentators (e.g. Hoveland and Wilcox).
In Posadas. a 5-4 Court upheld a Puerto Rico regula
tion that banned advertising of casino gambling on the
island. The regulation was aimed at discouraging casino
gambling by citizens of the Commonwealth while allowing
advertising aimed at tourists. Justice Rehnquist, writing
shortly before his elevation to chief justice, applied the
Central Hudson test, and found the statute permissible.
Rehnquist's underlying rationale makes Posadas impor
tant to any examination of commercial speech involving
Nevada brothel advertising.
Rehnquist reasoned that gambling was an activity that
could be completely proscribed by the state:

"The greater

power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling" (283), Rehnquist wrote. He continued:
It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino own
ers such as appellant to gain recognition of a First
Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the
residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the
legislature into banning casino gambling by residents
altogether. It would just as surely be a strange con-

stitutional doctrine which would concede to the leg
islature the authority to totally ban a product or
activity, but deny to the legislature the authority
to

forbid the stimulation of demand for the product

through advertising on behalf of those who would
profit from such increased demand.

(92 LEd. 2nd 284)

In his sharply-worded dissent, Justice Brennan replied
that the "strange constitutional doctrine" Rehnquist
referred to was known as the First Amendment (289 at n.
4). Rehnquist's position will be addressed more fully in
Chapter Three when we turn our attention to the divergent
First Amendment philosophies which underlie the differing
formulations of the commercial speech doctrine. For now,
it

will suffice to note that Rehnquist's opinion, while

clearly

indicating advertising of prostitution in Nevada

could be proscribed by the state, held that editorial com
ment on the same subject would remain fully protected by
the First Amendment:
[Ad v e r t i s i n g restrictions cannot be used to inhibit
either the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to
report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the free
dom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment
publicly on such matters as legislation relating to
casino gambling.

(92 LEd. 2d 280 at n. 7)

Posadas. then, reiterates a thread common throughout
the evolution of commercial speech doctrine —

that while

commercial expression may be regulated, editorial comment
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on commercial issues remains largely protected. Although
the level of protection enjoyed by commercial speech has
fluctuated over time, the notion that this level is dif
ferent that afforded editorial expression in general or
advertising in the "public interest" has remained con
stant.
A definitional problem, then, remains at the core of
the commercial speech doctrine. Commercial speech must not
only be truthful and non-misleading, it is also subject to
government suppression if the expression relates to acti
vity not itself constitutionally protected. On the other
hand, a publication's editorial content receives substan
tially more protection. This editorial content includes
more than "opinion" articles reflecting a publication's
position on issues of public interest; by common journal
istic usage "editorial" refers to all non-commercial con
tent in a publication.
Attempts to define commercial speech will be the focus
of Chapter Five. But before examining these attempts, it
will be helpful to review the philosophical positions that
have resulted in differing standards of protection for
different types of speech. It is these philosophical
assumptions, which underlie First Amendment theory in gen
eral, to which this thesis now turns.
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CHAPTER THREE

VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The cases discussed in Chapter Two reflect divergent
visions of the First Amendment —

from the narrow view of

protected speech articulated in Valentine to the expansive
philosophy of Virginia Board of Pharmacy to the retrench
ment of Posadas. These differing positions reflect differ
ent underlying philosophies as to what values the First
Amendment is intended to serve. Understanding those dif
fering interpretations of First Amendment values will be
helpful in evaluating the various definitions that have
been proposed for commercial speech, since any definition
of commercial speech necessarily reflects certain underly
ing assumptions. This chapter discusses these philosophi
cal positions, from the view that the First Amendment was
designed to protect only political speech to the broader
notion that the amendment serves the larger value of selfexpression. How these differing views have been applied to
commercial speech, and how they have resulted in a differ
ing level of the protection for such expression, will also
be examined.
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The Meiklejohn Paradigm
As noted, valentine v. Chrestensen reflects a narrow
view of what speech ought to be constitutionally pro
tected. Among modern constitutional scholars, the view
that the First Amendment was primarily intended to protect
political speech was first articulated by Alexander Mei
klejohn.

This view of the First Amendment is important

because, as Professor Martin Redish has observed, "Dr.
Meiklejohn's articulate exposition of the purposes that
lie behind the [F]irst [A]mendment has received consider
able attention, and some adherence, from both commentators
and the Supreme Court" (434).
In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government.
Meiklejohn argued that self-government is the essence of
the American political system. Meiklejohn concluded from
this premise that, "The guarantee given by the First
Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is
assured only to speech which bears, directly or indi
rectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal —

only

therefore, to the consideration of matters of public
interest" (94).
It follows from this that the First Amendment is
designed not to protect the rights of speakers, but to
ensure the free flow of information which facilitates the
effective functioning of the political system of selfgovernment. In this sense, Meiklejohn foreshadows the
audience-centered perspective the Supreme Court would
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later use, ironically enough, to expand dramatically the
First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech:
that the rights of the listener to receive information
were entitled to at least as much consideration as the
rights of speakers.
Meiklejohn drew a clear distinction between "public"
and "private" speech, arguing that only "public" dis
course, which he defined as expression relating to the
performance of self-governance, was protected by the First
Amendment. "Private" speech, that expression which took
place outside the political arena, would receive whatever
consideration to which it was legitimately entitled only
from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
This distinction between public and private speech is
not as clear as it might at first seem. How directly, for
instance, must speech affect public discourse before it is
granted the protection of the First Amendment? It was
reported that when the Court decided Sullivan. Meiklejohn
declared it was "an occasion for dancing in the streets"
(Kalven 221).

Thus, at least in some cases, Meiklejohn

allowed that some advertising, normally considered private
speech, might further political ends and ought to be con
sidered public.
If advertisements were to be considered public, then
what of literature, science, and scholarship? At first,
Meiklejohn suggested these might be relegated to what
Zechariah Chafee called the "obscure shelter" of the Fifth
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Amendment (Chafee 891). However, responding to the criti
cisms of Harry Kalven and Chafee, Meiklejohn subsequently
expanded his theory to allow "that the people do need nov
els and dramas and paintings and poems 'because they will
be called upon to vote,'" (The First Amendment 263).
Despite the difficulty in drawing any distinct line
between protected and unprotected speech, a politicallybased interpretation of the First Amendment remains
attractive to at least some scholars.

At the extreme end

of this tradition was Judge Robert Bork, whose position is
that First Amendment "protection should be accorded only
to speech that is explicitly political" (Bork 20). Richard
Barnes pointed out that this would exclude not only com
mercial speech, but science, literature and scholarship as
well (459).
Specifically addressing the issue of commercial speech
from the Meiklejohn perspective were Thomas H. Jackson and
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. These scholars took a somewhat
broader view than Bork, holding that political speech
"need not be limited to debate of government policy," but
may also "encompass a wider exchange of ideas and informa
tion antecedent to the formation of political opinion"
(10). Jackson and Jeffries would also protect certain eco
nomic speech, at least as it related to government policy:
For example, information concerning the degree of
concentration in a particular industry and the costs
and benefits of reducing (or increasing) that concen-
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tration may be considered relevant for informed deci
sion-making on antitrust policy, even if that infor
mation is not acquired in the course of a debate over
governmental action.

(10)

Presumably, too, debate on the legalization of prosti
tution and the public health concerns raised by the legal
status of brothels might be included in Jackson and Jef
fries' scheme of constitutional protection.
Like Meiklejohn, however, Jackson and Jeffries argued
that whatever protection is to be afforded private speech,
if any, must come from the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Thus, commercial speech, at least that which
does no more than propose an economic transaction, should
receive no constitutional protection. The authors argued
that the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case was wrongly
decided, since it resurrects the discredited constitu
tional notion of economic due process under the guise of
the First Amendment. They pointed out that in Carolene
Products. the Court struck down the holding in Lochner v.
New York that economic liberty was a constitutionally
protected right. Since Carolene Products, economic regula
tion has been considered a legislative, not a judicial
matter. Redefining the constitutional question as one of
free speech is inappropriate and does not mandate judicial
interference with legislative authority, according to
Jackson and Jeffries.
Jackson and Jeffries advanced the argument —

later
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relied upon by Rehnquist in his majority Posadas opinion
—

that the greater power to regulate economic activity

includes the lesser power to regulate commercial advertis
ing. They argued that the Court's holding in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy makes sense only if one assumes a First
Amendment value to advertising independent of its role in
facilitating the sale of a given commodity.

"That no such

independent purpose in fact can be identified confirms the
hypothesis that the significance of ordinary business
advertising lies in its relation to the contemplated eco
nomic transaction" (Jackson and Jeffries 36).
Finally, Jackson and Jeffries criticized the notion,
expressed by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, that
the failure to expand the protection of commercial speech
will result in definitional difficulties.

Indeed, the

authors claimed, a reliable way to distinguish between
commercial and non-commercial speech is not necessary for
two reasons.
First, the Court's concern that advertisers would
attempt to evade legislative restraint by clothing their
advertisements in political commentary is, they argued,
"belied by experience" (22). They noted that the record in
the Virginia Board of Phar- macy case contains no evidence
of such subterfuge; nor did the only such instance dealt
with by the Court, Valentine v. Chrestensen. seem to
present any definitional difficulty for the justices. Sec
ond, since the primary purpose of advertising is to make
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money, the fact that "politicized" advertisements would
likely be less effective would serve as an economic con
straint against such attempts at subterfuge. As the
authors stated: "Economic self-interest would often coun
sel against any elaborate ruse to convey a forbidden com
mercial message" (24).
However, Jackson and Jeffries' arguments remain uncon
vincing. The existence of Nevada brothel messages belies
the authors' argument that the Court is engaging in pure
speculation rather than with realistic concerns. So does
Valentine v. Chrestensen. despite both the Court's and the
authors' cavalier dismissal of the case's explicit defini
tional problem.

That the Court created a definition for

commercial speech in Valentine —
advertising" —

"purely commercial

and then seemed to disregard this defini

tion in its holding, underlines the unresolved nature of
the problem.
Neither can much weight be given Jackson and Jeffries'
argument that economic self-interest would preclude
attempts at subterfuge. Here, the authors viewed advertis
ing only in the most simplistic terms. Modern advertising
is not limited to, or indeed even largely composed of
simple announcements of price and availability. The very
existence of issue and institutional corporate advertis
ing, press releases and other forms of business communica
tion argue against the notion that "subterfuge" is econom
ically unfeasible. Nor does the authors' argument consider
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that such subterfuge may be the only way for an advertiser
to get his message into the marketplace. Such is certainly
the case with Nevada brothel messages, since any form of
such advertising is banned in Clark and Washoe counties,
the chief sources of customers for the rural houses of
prostitution. Should other business interests, tobacco or
alcohol producers for example, find themselves similarly
prohibited from advertising, it is not unreasonable to
suppose they might resort to such measures on a national
level.
In addition, there may be motivations other than "sub
terfuge" involved. Who is to say that Youngs Drug Company
is not genuinely interested in birth control or public
health and honestly wishes to educate the public on such
matters? Who knows for certain that brothel owners are not
genuinely concerned about AIDS as a public health issue?
Finally, the lack of a plethora of actual cases reaching
the Supreme Court which require a distinction be made
between commercial and non-commercial speech does not
obviate the need for such a definition. Jackson and Jef
fries cited Bork, who noted that "The existence of close
cases is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so deny
majorities the power to govern in areas where their power
is legitimate" (Bork 28). Nor should refusal to draw
needed lines deny the judiciary the power to adjudicate.
The authors also pointed to Rehnquist's dissent in Virgi
nia Board of Pharmacy, where the justice argued that it is
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one thing to speculate about some future case that may
require subtle distinctions and quite another to use this
rationale to displace legislative authority (Jackson and
Jeffries 19). Justice Rehnquist also noted in that dissent
that:
There are undoubted difficulties with an effort to
draw a bright line between "commercial speech" on the
one hand and "protected speech" on the other, and the
Court does better to face up to these difficulties
than to attempt to hide them under labels.

(787)

It can certainly be argued that a search for defini
tions of categories of speech better faces up to defini
tional difficulties than does hiding them under the label
of judicial restraint. While it is certainly an accepted
principle of appropriate judicial restraint that courts
avoid sweeping constitutional pronouncements where pos
sible, it is also the judiciary's mandate to answer such
questions when necessary.
Jackson and Jeffries noted that Virginia Board of
Pharmacy would have been decided correctly "[h]ad the case
involved political commentary or the publication of news
worthy information" (16). But if this is true —

and

indeed it seems an accepted principle of commercial speech
case law that it is —

then one cannot avoid facing the

definitional issues of just what constitutes political
commentary or newsworthy information as opposed to some
yet ill-defined category of "commercial speech," Jackson
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and Jeffries' claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Self Expression Paradigm
Although he reached much the same conclusion as Jack
son and Jeffries —

that commercial speech should be out

side the protection of the First Amendment —

Professor C.

Edwin Baker viewed the issue from a very different per
spective. To Baker, self expression, rather than political
expediency was the central value served by the First
Amendment. He summarized his theory of the amendment suc
cinctly: "As long as speech represents the freely chosen
expression of the listener while depending for its power
on the free acceptance of the speaker, freedom of speech
represents a charter of liberty for non-coercive action"
(7). For Baker, the First Amendment was designed to allow
free individuals to develop their own visions of a good
life.
Commercial speech, for Baker, could never be equated
with self expression, since it is motivated by a desire
for profit, rather than expressing the values of the
speaker. Baker argued that a whiskey company, for
instance, would promote whiskey regardless of the personal
feelings of its managers, employees or stockholders (18).
Although Baker admitted the press is motivated by profit,
he distinguishes the media from other businesses on the
ground that media are protected by the press clause of the
First Amendment.

Baker seemed satisfied with a traditional
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notion of the press, and would not expand the definition
of press to include corporate-sponsored image advertising,
even when explicitly political.
Baker's anti-capitalist perspective had also to dis
tinguish economically-motivated speech on the part of
labor unions, which he favored, from that of corporations,
which he opposed. He did so by arguing, perhaps unconvin
cingly, that the market did not determine the speech of
labor unions (37).
The key to understanding Baker is that one must real
ize that his First Amendment theory is what one commenta
tor has termed "an alternative to marketplace theory"
(Shiffrin 1243). Baker rejected the "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor articulated by John Stuart Mill and implicit in
the audience-centered perspective of Bork and Jackson and
Jeffries, arguing that the marketplace disproportionately
represents the status quo on important issues. Instead,
Baker advanced a uniquely source-focused theory of the
First Amendment, based upon self fulfillment through self
expression without coercion. This, for Baker, became a
constitutional principle not to be balanced away in favor
of other societal interests. Indeed, Baker was generally
critical of balancing and in favor of judicial "prin
ciples," arguing that the weighing of competing interests
led to inconsistent results and offered little protection
to fundamental liberties.
In addition to the problems with motivation already
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discussed in regards to Jackson and Jeffries, Baker's
theory is open to other criticisms. As Professor Steven
Shiffrin has noted:
If [Baker} is correct that people's perspectives "are
greatly influenced, if not determined” by their loca
tion in a specific socio-economic structure, then it
becomes difficult to understand why individual speech
reflects free choice any more than does corporate
speech.

(1246)

One can also observe, as did Shiffrin, that Baker's
scholarship "is a piece of advocacy designed to promote
change” (1248). As such, although he provided at least one
way of looking at commercial speech, Baker must be
approached circumspectly.
Of more value, perhaps, is the theory of Professor
Martin Redish. Redish, too, focused on the value of self
expression, but arrived at the opposite conclusion from
Baker in regards to commercial speech. For Baker, the
First Amendment protected the union picketer, but not the
businessman. Redish, on the other hand, posed the follow
ing analogy: ” [I]f the constitutional guarantee of free
speech permits a picket to stand in front of a business
establishment to urge patrons not to enter, then by the
same reasoning a merchant could stand in the doorway of
his establishment and solicit customers" (430).
For Redish, the matter also went beyond simple social
equity. Focusing on the receiver of advertising messages
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rather than the source, Redish was able to discern impor
tant First Amendment values which were served by commer
cial speech:
It has long been recognized that one function of gov
ernment is to promote the general welfare —

to

assist the citizenry in achieving a materially satis
factory life. It is also generally recognized that
advertising, at least in theory, may serve a vital
role in aiding an individual's attainment of that
goal.

(432)

Redish admitted that much actual advertising did not
fulfill this informational function, but argued that this
did not lessen the level of constitutional protection to
which all advertising should be entitled.
In an argument similar to that later put forth by the
Court majority in Virginia Board of Pharmacy. Redish
argued that commercial decisions were often more important
to the individual than political ones. Commercial speech
was seen as similar to political speech, but on a smaller
scale. Redish argued that if society held political selfgovernment to be important, then by the same reasoning,
"private self-government" in the economic marketplace
should similarly be nurtured by protecting commercial
speech (442).

Perhaps the most important First Amendment

function of commercial speech for Redish was its role in
allowing the individual to achieve "the maturation of his
rational capabilities" (441). Commercial speech, particu
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larly price advertising, facilitates rational decision
making in the marketplace, encouraging consumers to weigh
price and other product information before making personal
economic decisions. Such behavior allows the consumer to
"exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him
towards the intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment"
(444). Although it is true that advertisements might not
provide mental exercise to the extent of that provided by
literature and at least some forms of political debate,
Redish reminded his reader that the Supreme Court has seen
fit to grant substantial First Amendment protection to
other forms of communication, including much political
speech, far below this rarified standard (444).
Redish called the task of distinguishing commercial
from non-commercial speech an "onerous" one, avoidance of
which could threaten otherwise protected expression (431).
But in the final analysis, Redish's theory would eliminate
the need for defining commercial speech, since such speech
would be elevated to the level of protected political com
munication. Certainly, the very act of defining commercial
speech implies that it is entitled to a different, if not
lesser, level of protection than that afforded other cate
gories of speech.

Rationalizing the Regulation
of Commercial Speech
By defining commercial speech, we distinguish commer-
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cial speech from other communication in terms of what
makes it unique. The Court has already implicitly done so.
However, the traditional rationales for regulating commerspeech —

that such speech is inherently hardier and more

easily verifiable than other forms of communication —

are

easily dismissed.
As already noted, in denying certiorari in National
Commission on Egg Nutrition v. F T C , the Supreme Court
itself observed that in some areas, commercial information
is actually less subject to verification than other cate
gories of speech.

Certainly the nutritional aspects of

some foods would be one such area. Others might include
the health benefits of certain substances, or even the
economic ramifications of governmental action or of indi
vidual purchasing behavior.
ment "Buy American —

For instance, is the state

help reduce the trade deficit"

empirically verifiable or not? In any event, commercial
speech as a class seems no more verifiable than political
speech —

indeed, in many cases it would seem less so. As

Farber has observed: "A political candidate knows the
truth about his own past and his present intentions, yet
misrepresentations on these subjects are immune from state
regulation" (386).
Nor does commercial speech, as a class, seem any hard
ier than other types of speech. First, it is dangerous to
allow the motivation of economic self-interest to serve as
a basis for the level of protection afforded a given cate

gory of communication. Extending such a rationale could
threaten economically motivated communication on the part
of newspapers, office seekers, and others whose speech
rightfully enjoys strong constitutional safeguards. The
argument that commercial speech is somehow hardier also
seems to assume that advertising is usually done by large
corporations with considerable resources available with
which to disseminate their economic messages. But even a
cursory examination of Supreme Court commercial speech
case law belies this supposition. On the contrary, reli
gious groups, civil rights advocates, and abortion coun
seling centers have all relied on advertising to communi
cate to mass publics. Such speech seems no more hardy, nor
less important, than much that is fully protected under
the First Amendment.
Still, reasons for allowing some form of regulation of
commercial speech remain. First, even if commercial speech
is not more intrinsically verifiable than other forms of
speech, there are often aspects of such speech that are
similar to contracts. Farber has noted that "the constitu
tional status of an advertisement describing a product may
be unclear, but a seller is obviously liable for damages
for failure to deliver a product corresponding to the con
tract description" (387). Although the existence of an
implied contract does not seem by itself to warrant prior
restraint of commercial speech, it does lend weight to
governmental claims regarding the need to regulate
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patently false or deceptive speech.
Such claims appear even more legitimate when one con
siders that while it is today an accepted constitutional
principle that "[t]he First Amendment requires that we
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters" (Gertz 341), such protection is limited to pub
lic, rather than private matters, in defamation law.

The

Court in Gertz decided that falsehood might sometimes need
to be protected in cases of clear public interest, but
many commercial speech cases deal only with private eco
nomic choices.
Finally, while a standard of absolute protection for
commercial speech might seem theoretically appealing,
since it would allow for easy resolution of many difficult
issues, such a standard would be unrealistic. A majority
of the Court has never endorsed an absolutist interpreta
tion of the First Amendment generally; it is highly
unlikely it would do so in commercial speech cases. At the
same time, commercial speech intuitively seems different
from other forms of speech, and as such might deserve a
different standard of protection. Attempting to articulate
those differences, and fashioning from them a workable
definition of commercial speech that satisfies adherents
of both the Meiklejohn and self-expression paradigms is a
subject to which we will return in the final chapter of
this thesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR

BROTHEL MESSAGES IN NEVADA

Distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech
became an issue in Nevada soon after the constitutionality
of banning brothel advertisements in Clark and Washoe
counties (NRS 201.430) was upheld by the Nevada Supreme
Court in 1982, three years following the law's enactment.
The court's decision in Princess,. Sea Industries v. Nevada.
has been criticized as "an opinion filled with righteous
ness" (Simon 234). This chapter discusses the shortcomings
of the Princess Sea decision before moving on to the
changes that case engendered in the dissemination of
brothel messages.
The case went to the Nevada Supreme Court when attor
neys for brothel owner Walter Plankinton and two adultoriented publications, Las Vegas Panorama and Las Vegas
Mirror. argued the law violated their client's First
Amendment rights to free expression.

Citing U.S. Supreme

Court case law on commercial speech, the appellants argued
that since brothel prostitution was a lawful activity,
advertising of that activity could not be curtailed.
Deputy Attorney General Joshua Landish, who, with
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Edwards, argued the case before the court, admitted that:
It is beyond dispute that after the Supreme Court's
rulings in B.i.gelQW . . .

Virginia Pharmacy Board . .

. and Bates, that paid commercial advertisements are
not stripped of First Amendment protection merely
because they appear in that form.

(Landish 29)

But Landish went on to argue that:
[I]n concluding that commercial speech may be
afforded a degree of First Amendment protection, the
Court stressed its
holding did not mean that commercial advertising
could never be regulated in any way. On the contrary,
the Court specifically recognized that some forms of
commercial speech regulations were surely permissible
(96 S. Ct. at 1817). The Court noted: ". . . there is
no claim that the transaction proposed in the forbid
den advertisements are themselves (sic) illegal in
any way.” (34)
Anticipating Rehnquist in Posadas. Landish reasoned
that since brothel prostitution was illegal in Clark
County and the state was entitled to regulate prostitution
in all its jurisdictions, it could certainly regulate the
advertising of brothel prostitution (Record on Appeal 39).
Nonetheless, the Nevada Supreme Court avoided the
First Amendment issues involved and relied simply on a
"presumption of constitutionality” in Justice John Mow
bray's majority opinion, arguing that "the legislative
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enactment in question does not clearly contravene consti
tutional principles as thus far articulated by the United
States Supreme Court" (Princess Sea 283).
Mowbray's analysis is unsatisfactory. United States v.
Carolene Products clearly limits the application of the
presumption of constitutionality to laws of economic regu
lation, and not to potential abridgements of the First
Amendment rights of either speakers or listeners. Indeed,
cases involving questions of fundamental liberties require
courts to apply strict scrutiny, and laws which appear to
abridge such rights are to be presumed unconstitutional.
More satisfactory, from a constitutional doctrine
point of view, is Justice Noel Manoukian's concurring
opinion in Princess S e a .

"I believe that those in the

majority fail to sufficiently address the important First
Amendment issue of this appeal,” Manoukian wrote. "In
light of the many recent United States Supreme Court hold
ings bearing on this vital question, it is incumbent on
this Court to re-examine and fully discuss the First
Amendment when it is dispositive of the case at hand."
(283)
Manoukian relied on an argument Landish used in his
"Points and Authorities,” filed with the Nevada Supreme
Court June 28, 1979.

Although commercial speech is

entitled to some measure of constitutional protection,
Landish argued the level of such protection is less than
that afforded purely political speech. Manoukian agreed,
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noting:
To require parity of constitutional protection for
commercial speech and noncommercial speech could
invite dilution, simply by a levelling process, of
the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect
to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the
First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi
tion in the scale of First Amendment values" (Prin
cess Sea 285).
Manoukian, citing Ohralik. correctly pointed out that
the Court explicitly endorsed a lower level of judicial
scrutiny in commercial speech cases (Princess Sea 285). He
concluded that "the advertisement of prostitution does not
pertain to fundamental constitutional interests as does
the advertisement of abortion" (285). Rather, the justice
concluded, "The speech at hand is due little, if any pro
tection. It involves entertainment, not information or
ideas" (Princess Sea 287).
Still, attorneys for Plankinton and the publications
argued that brothel advertising dealt with an issue in the
public interest. Their arguments underline the difficulty
of defining what sorts of otherwise commercial speech
might be protected because they deal with issues of either
import or notoriety:
[T]he advertisements lay bare and open avenues of

discussion and debate on the legalized, medically
controlled practice of one of the "oldest of profes
sions", obviously polarizing the American public as
diametrically as the hitherto well-litigated areas of
capital punishment, abortion, dissemination of birth
control products and information and the personal
viewing of obscene motion pictures in the home.
Whether prostitution should be legalized in licensed
medically controlled brothels has long been a subject
of debate in many areas. That Nevada permits such an
activity in certain of its counties has greatly
advanced such debate and provided a viable forum and
actual basis to foster such discussions and debates.
Petitioners (sic) advertisement advances such mean
ingful discussion and debate, for clearly anyone
responding to such an advertisement and becoming a
patron thus becomes an informed voice in the Freedom
of Speech on this almost ageless subject.

(Hanson and

Smith 20)
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case
and denied petitioners certiorari in 1981. Although both
courts rejected advertisements as an avenue for debate and
discussion on prostitution, it soon became apparent adver
tisements weren't the only "viable forum" available to
those interested in disseminating brothel information.
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Comment or Advertisement?
As commercial speech, of course, brothel messages
would clearly be proscribable under Posadas. But, as noted
in Chapter One, even Rehnquist approvingly cites Pitts
burgh Press in support of the idea that editorial expres
sion is always due full First Amendment protection. The
line between the two remains far from distinct.
The July 6, 1979 issue of the Las Vegas M i r r o r , was
published the same week NRS 201.430 took effect. The Mir
r o r . a tourist-oriented publication, contained entertain
ment and gaming articles and was supported by advertise
ments for resort hotels, car rental agencies and other
businesses with a large visitor trade. Prior to July 1979,
the Mirror also ran advertisements for a variety of adultoriented businesses, including brothels. But the July 6
issue carried no brothel advertisements; instead, the Mir
ror carried an article entitled "Gone But Not Forgotten."
The article was a sentimental history of the role of
brothels in the old West, as well as a discussion of the
current legal difficulties facing brothel advertisers.
Frontier prostitutes were described as "Sisters of Mercy"
who tended to the needs of lonely pioneers.
The article then discussed NRS 201.430. Clark County
District Attorney Bob Miller and Edward Bernstein, an
attorney for Princess Sea Industries, were quoted discuss
ing each side of the Princess Sea case.
Accompanying the article was a brothel advertisement
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labeled "example.11 (See Figure One.) Clearly visible on
the advertisement were a map detailing how to reach Las
Vegas's "closest and finest brothel, the World Famous
Chicken Ranch," telephone numbers to the brothel and a
limousine service, and descriptions of services offered at
the brothel. These services were said to include the
"largest selection of girls," "outcall services" and "dom
inant females for passive males." Also appearing on the
advertisement was a caricature of two policemen holding a
sign reading,

"censored" between them. A comparison of

this "example" with a similar advertisement in the Mirror
run before the passage of NRS 201.430 indicates the "cen
sored" sign covers only the words "and still growing
strong" and "courtesy gas available to our customers."
Such brothel messages have been continuously distrib
uted in Las Vegas, without reference to NRS 201.430, since
1979, according to Deputy District Attorney Edwards.
Edwards said the constitutional status of the messages is
too unclear to warrant prosecution. Despite complaints
from some Las Vegas citizens concerning the sexual nature
of the materials,

efforts to remove the vending racks

containing the magazine were discontinued, he said, when
it was decided by his office that such measures would have
to apply equally to all publications distributed in such a
manner —

whether they contained brothel messages or not.

For the purposes of this study, flyers containing
brothel messages were obtained from newsracks on Las Vegas
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Fig. 1. Example, "Gone But Not Forgotten."
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Boulevard and on Fremont Street between Fall 1987 and
Summer 1988. One 16-page flyer, entitled Fantasy To RememfeSC is typical of these materials. Fantasy to Remember is
made up almost entirely of pages labeled "paid advertise
ment," which tell of "nude show-dancers" who offer to per
form in a customer's hotel room.
Only one page of the publication contains more than a
few words of copy, the publication being dominated by sug
gestive pictures of scantily-clad women. Labelled "edito
rial," the page is headlined "Positively the Closest
Brothel to Las Vegas." (See Figure Two.) It displays tele
phone numbers for the Chicken Ranch and for free air or
limousine transportation service, a map showing how to
reach the brothel, and a description of the facilities. In
addition to a bar, a jukebox, and "eight-person jacuzzis
offering private and group relaxation and enjoyment," the
Chicken Ranch offers facilities to accommodate the physi
cally handicapped, including widened doors and wheelchair
ramps.
The "Ladies of the Chicken Ranch" are also described.
(This part of the editorial could not be reproduced due to
production limitations.) Their ages (18-37) and outside
interests (nursing, teaching, real estate, farming,
finance and physical fitness) are discussed.

"One of the

ladies speaks five languages and is still learning," the
editorial notes. The writer of the editorial also stated
that the prostitutes are involved in charitable activities

PLEASE NOTE:

C opyrighted m aterials in this d o c u m e n t have
not b e e n filmed at th e re q u e s t of th e author.
They are available for co n su ltatio n , however,
in th e a u th o rs university library.

T h e se co n sist of p a g e s:

6 5 (Figure 2:

Fantasy to Remember)
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in their spare time:

" [T]heir support of the local Pahrump

senior citizens' fund-raisers indicates their caring sup
port of their home away from home."
Judging from the use of the word "editorial," it would
seem the publishers of the flyers are using it in the
sense touched upon in Chapter Three —

to refer to any

non-advertising content. Such content could, of course,
go beyond discussion of political issues or other matters
in the public interest. In this sense, the term "edito
rial" might be properly applied to any expression pro
tected by the First Amendment, including entertainment,
literature and, artwork.
A second 16-page flyer, titled Singles Expose, also
contains a single "editorial" page, headlined,

"Legal

Whorehouses... Only 45 minutes from Vegas but, oh, what a
difference it makes!"

(See Figure Three). This editorial

emphasizes the safety of Nevada brothels from a public
health perspective. It states that the girls are inspected
weekly by a physician and that "health problems are virtu
ally non-existent." It also warns that prostitution is
illegal in Clark County and that "you have no protection
against encountering an unhappy experience if you pick up
a street walker."
The "editorial" goes on to describe the facilities at
the Cherry Patch and at Mabel's and includes a map. "For
information purposes, we are printing a map of the area,
displaying the location of Mabel's and other significant
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Legal Whorehouses...Only 45
minutes from Vegas but, oh,
what a difference it makes!
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tourist attractions," the article states. These other
attractions include the towns of Mercury, Pahrump, Ash
Meadows, and the Cherry Patch brothel.
The "Wild West" theme seen in the Mirror "editorial"
discussed above is further evolved in an article appearing
in the Sept. 11 1987 issue of Las Vegas After Dar k . (See
Figure Four.) Unlike the flyers described above, Las Vegas
After Dark is a more traditional editorial forum with
entertainment features, show reviews, and an opinion piece
entitled "Abort Bork," in which readers are urged to
oppose the nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court of the
former appellate court judge. The brothel story, head
lined,

"The Brothels of Nevada; In the Spirit of the Old

West...Only 45 minutes from Vegas, but oh, what a differ
ence it makes!

(16)" focuses on the social role brothels

have historically played;
Much has been told over the years about the Winning
of the West. About those courageous pioneers who
blazed new trails into the wilderness, taming that
virgin land and making it their own.
These brave men needed uncomplicated outlets for
their pent-up passions. Equally courageous and adven
turous women soon followed, and the first brothels in
the west opened, flourished and grew.
The feature points out that prostitutes are inspected
by a health officer monthly —

"That is why the US Dept of

Health recommends the legal brothels of Nevada in these
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Fig- 4. Las Vegas After D a r k . Sept. 1 1 , 1987
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uncertain times" —

and concludes:

History tells us that the healthiest societies are
those which enable people to satisfy their basic
needs with the least amount of difficulty and risk
and be free the rest of the time to work toward the
betterment of humanity. The American West was won by
pioneering individuals who believed in hard work and
equally hard play. So enjoy yourself in Las Vegas
and, if you want to play away from the tables, drive
a few miles north and do it the safer way.
A second issue of Las Vegas After D a r k , dated Nov. 27
- Dec. 3, 1987, elaborates on the public safety and health
issue. The front cover of the magazine announces: "Broth
els Safest Says AIDS Chief Page 16." (See Figure Five.) In
the page 16 editorial, Clark County health official Rick
Reich is quoted as saying legal Nevada brothels are "espe
cially safe," in light of the fact that no case of AIDS
has ever surfaced in a licensed house of prostitution. The
editorial contrasts "safe" legal houses of prostitution,
where customers must wear condoms, to prostitution on the
streets, "where there is no way to know whether or not
such a prostitute is infected."

(See Figure Six.) On page

17, facing the editorial, is an advertisement for "Free
Tourist Information," including information about brothels
close to Las Vegas.

(See Figure Seven.) On the two pages

before the editorial is an article similar in appearance
to the one appearing in the Sept.

11 issue of Las Vegas

BR O TH EL INFO

rage 15

V O n e

B u tie s
proper

H o rse T oo
Page 5

Fig. 5. Las Veaas After D a r k . Nov. 27, 1987.
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Laa Vagaa AFTER DARK, Nov. 27-Dee. 3, 1987

• CCH H ENTAPy

Brothels Offer
Safer Sex

Legal brothels are the safest places these days for a man to have a sexual
experience, outside of the bonds of marriage. That's the word from state and
county health officials.
In fact, according to Clark County Health Districk AIDS Services Coordinator
Rick Reich, not a single woman working in a legal brothel, either in Nevada
or in Calgary, Canada (the other location in North America where brothels are
allowed), has ever tested positive for the AIDS virus.
For the past year and a half, the State of Nevada has required that every
applicant for a position with a legal brothel be tested for the virus prior to be
ing licensed to work. During that time, six women taking the test turned up
positive, meaning they had been exposed at some dine to the vims. That doesn't
necessarily mean these women had AIDS or were carrying it, but they were sdll
excluded from working at a Nevada brothel.
Reich adds that because all brothel employees are required to be tested every
two weeks during their employment, he now has statistics confirming that
brothels are no place to find this dread disease. Not one brothel worker has
“ sero-converted,” meaning that no one who tested aegadve prior to going to
work at a brothel has subsequendy tested positive.
“ The fact that legal brothels now require all clients to use condoms makes
them especially safe from the threat of AIDS and all other sexually transmitted
diseases,” says Reich.
By contrast, streetwalker protltutes are not monitored In any way and there
is no way for a potential customer to know whether or not such a prostitute
may be infected.
In a time of anxiety, that’s good news to everyone in this area, resident or
visitor.
By the way, Reich also states that there are no reported cases of AIDS or
even positive blood testing for AIDS even from prostitutes working legally in
Western Europe. As anyone who has ever visited Aauterdam, Hamburg or a
number of other European cities knows, there are districts within each of these
municipalities where prostitution is legal.
Working women are inspected regularly by health officials and pay normal
taxea on their wages. They also receive health insaraace and retirement benefits.
It’s good that parts of Nevada and of Calgary permit the operation of legal
brothels. Wouldn't it be better, from both a medical and societal standpoint,
if s m B suctions of New York, Chicago, Los Angdes and other American cities
were nansd for this activity?
O tiaM i not triaklsg to participate or to witness such goings-on would know
where not to go, and the rest of their cities — as in Europe — would be kept
free from any form of prostitution.
If someone wants to gamble legally in the United States, he or she knows
where to go; the state of Nevada or Atlantic City, New Jersey. Gambling is
a bask hnataa urge, as, of course, is sex.
Neither Is likely to disappear as long as hnmanlty survives. How much better
to provide appropriate, regulated places for them than to force individuals to
break the law and risk personal dangers in order to satisfy their bask needs.
Until other parts of oar great country become more enHghtmrd in these areas,
we can at least be thankful for the legal casinos — and the brothels — we do
have.

'Tasty Tidbits'
•From page 3
recalls about her private bank account
in those days an d . when th a t was gone,
she would tell his secretary and another
deposit would be m ade.
She would custom arily do her shop
ping at L ondons posh H a rro d ’s depart
ment store and the same secretary would
be sent the bill. Now, she has to pay her
own bills an d d o esn 't like it one bit.

So you think bigtime TV execs have
it made! CBS Entertainment last week
axed three VPs from its payroll, along
with 32 other workers.
Included in the firings were VPs Nan
cy Bien, Bob Silberling and Peter
Frankovich. Lesser firees all cam e from
the dept, o f telepix (TV movies) and
miniseries.
This is the latest bloodletting in CBS’
e ffo rt to get rid o f its red ink. Earlier
this year, the fam ed CBS News Dept,
was severely pruned, prom pting anchor
m an D an R ather to say the word
“ C ourage” a t the end o f one o f his
newscasts, in a n attem p t to com fort his
colleagues.

Vegas movie producer Ray Sleekier,
whose past epics include “ Blood Shack”
and “ The Vegas Slasher,” hosted a par
ty a couple of weekends ago in the Sands
Hotel room of some of his prospective
new investors.
A m o n g th o s e p re s e n t f o r th e
festivities were Palom ino Club strip
tease artist C hristi Cam bell (see photo),
actress A drienne G arcia (who was
featured here som e weeks ago after she
revealed how she has been proposition
ed on the “ Las Vegas Casting C ouch"),
C hannel 13 reporter Sandy Beal and his
astrologer-friend, Celia.
T he investors, from C anada, were be
ing w ooed by Steckier in hopes they
w ould back an o th er o f his features,
which are now shot directly for video.
B ut, the investors, still suffering from
the O ct. crash o f w orld stock m arkets,
have n ot yet com e through with the re
quired dough.
____________________

la s Vegas Publishers, Inc.
dba

CASINO NCUJS
Now In Its llth VearServlog Th«
Hntnl Industry's Personnel I
entertainers

RMPH pernio
Oeneral Manager

MoBng eddresst P.O. Box IS330,
IV, NV W ild ._ located ot> 1430SC Industrie! ltd. IV, NV 1*1Ot
Pbenei (70S) 344-W00

Fi<?* 6- Lag. Vecras After D a r k . Nov. 27, 1987,

'•Editorial.”

Fig. 7. Las Veaas After D a r k . "Tourist Information."
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After Dark. (See Figure Eight.)
In 1988, with AIDS an ongoing concern, brothel mes
sages continue to focus on public health. An 8-page flyer
titled "Showgirls and Showdancers,l! containing many of the
same advertisements seen in Singles Expose and Fantasy to
Remember. features an "editorial" entitled "Safe Sex What
Everyone Should Know." (See Figure Nine.) The editorial
claims that with the advent of public concern over AIDS,
Nevada brothels have been declared "100 percent safe" by
state health officials. A picture of a hot tub, a limou
sine and a seductively-smiling woman adorn the "edito
rial," which prints a single phone number to call for fur
ther information or free transportation to Sheri's Ranch.
When addressing public health issues, these "editori
als" contain much information which is either false or
misleading. It seems highly unlikely that public officials
would have ever "recommended" brothels or called them "100
percent safe," nor are these claims ever documented. If
false, such statements might run afoul of the Federal
Trade Commission, and would certainly put them outside the
protection of the First Amendment when considered as com
mercial speech. But if one considers the statements edito
rial opinion —

ideas rather than facts —

they might well

be within the law. As previously noted, the First Amend
ment does not recognize the existence of a false idea
(Sertz 339).
Therefore, in addition to Simon's concern that lack of
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SAFE

What Everyone
Should Know
If you are a local or visitor to
Las Vegas and are looking
for a safe sexual encounter,
Nevada’s legalized brothels
are the answer.

With the advent of the AIDS scare. Nevada brothels have been
declared 100% safe by the Nevada Health Dept. Sheri’s Ranch in
Pahrump Nevada has
been known for its
dedication to providing
the clean luxurious and
if
courteous service,
which earned it and it
alone a six star rating
in the book “Brothels
of Nevada.”
Sheri’s Ranch being
the oldest name in
So. Nevada brothels
has carried on with its
tradition of over 25 years
providing clean safe sex to its customers.
All girls in the ranches have regular weekly health inspections by a
Certified Doctor. Sheri’s Ranch being absolutely the closest brothel to Las
Vegas provides free limousine service to and from Sheri’s Ranch.
So for the time of your life at a down-to-earth price & freedom from
disease visit Sheri s Ranch.
For more information or
free limousine
service call

365-1118

. 9. "Safe Sex —

What Everyone Should Know."

commercial speech definitions might dilute the protec
tion offered core speech, there is also the danger that
imprecision could lead to the protection of speech which
might be legitimately controlled.

The question, then, is

not only one of choosing between control or freedom, as
proponents of commercial speech rights sometimes suggest.
The question is one of separating that speech which it is
in society's legitimate interest to control from that
deserving the full protection of the First Amendment.
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CHAPTER FIVE

DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The messages with which the Nevada judiciary dealt in
Princess Sea Industries were treated by both sides as
advertisements, and definitional issues were not raised at
any level of that case. Justice Mowbray cited U.S. Supreme
Court case law recognizing a "'commonsense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government reg
ulation, and other varieties of speech'" fohralik
455-456) .
The U.S. Supreme Court has tended to evaluate commer
cial speech cases in terms of two "commonsense" defini
tional components: message and content. A third component,
the context in which a message appears, has also received
some attention. In this chapter, the definitions arising
from message content, speaker intent and communication
context will be applied to the brothel messages examined
in Chapter Four. It will be seen that while most of the
definitions offer certain insights into the nature of com
mercial speech, none can distinguish commercial from non
commercial messages with any reliability.
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Message-Based Definitions
Perhaps the most common distinction proposed is to
equate commercial speech with advertising, a form of com
munication which generally consists of messages that pub
lications have been paid to project. But such a definition
founders on at least two grounds. First, an examination of
the brothel messages reveals an implicit claim that the
brothel messages in question have not been paid for.

As

already noted, while nearly every page in the booklets
from which the messages in Figures Two, Three, Four, and
Nine are taken are labeled "Paid Advertisement," those
pages on which the brothel messages appear are labeled
"Editorial." The implication is that these messages repre
sent the editorial voice of the publishers of the book
lets. Defining commercial speech as paid advertising,
therefore, is underinclusive. By the same logic, a newspa
per's commercial messages regarding circulation, advertis
ing or employment opportunities could never be categorized
as commercial speech as long as they appeared in the spon
soring publication, since they were not paid for in the
traditional advertising sense. In addition, there is the
potential problem, again suggested by the brothel messages
under discussion, of proving a given communication had
been paid for by someone other than the publisher of the
medium in which it appeared.
A second problem with such a definition is that the
U.S. Supreme Court itself has rejected the notion that
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messages lose their constitutional protection if money has
been paid to project them (New York Times v. Sullivan). A
lesser standard regarding paid advertising might well
threaten the protected constitutional status of political
campaign commercials and other messages which are expli
citly political, but nonetheless commercial in the sense
that they have been paid for. Therefore, defining commer
cial speech as advertising is not only underinclusive;
such a definition seems overbroad as well, since the Court
has chosen to exclude advertising in the public interest
from the type of commercial speech regulation normally
permitted.
Still, the first definition used by the Court, in
Valentine v. Chrestensen. was based entirely upon message
content. There, the Court defined commercial speech as
"purely commercial advertising," a definition which seems
very narrow if applied to Nevada brothel messages. Only
the message in Figure Seven seems "purely commercial;" the
rest have considerable non-commercial elements. That the
Court itself did not apply its own definition to Valen
tine's handbill in no way saves this definition. If such a
definition's connotative meaning were actually to be
applied, it would seem that advertisers need only add
information or entertainment value to their messages to
have them fall outside the category of "purely commercial
advertising."
The inadequacy of such a definition should be even
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more apparent when one considers a later version of the
same message-based formula, the one used in Pittsburgh
Press. In that case, the Court declared that commercial
speech was that which did "no more than propose a commer
cial transaction" (385). Under this definition, only the
brothel message in Figure One, with its statement, "We
accept Visa and Master Charge," makes a reference to a
specific economic transaction, and should be considered
commercial. Not one of the messages mentions payment for
or price of a specific sexual activity, factors which
would seem to be necessary before one could meaningfully
discuss a commercial transaction with a prostitute.
In general then, one can conclude that message-based
definitions of commercial speech suffer from underinclu
siveness. They fail to reach all but the simplest form of
price advertising and are easily eluded by advertisers
seeking to insulate their messages from government regula
tion. This is unfortunate, because, as Richard Barnes
claimed, such definitions are at least "objective" in that
"all that need be determined is the speech's content"
(488).

Speaker Intent
Still, the Court has on occasion relied on definitions
which turn on motive. Perhaps this represents an effort to
remedy the underinclusiveness encountered when evaluating
content only. Unfortunately, motive-based definitions are

even more troublesome than message-based distinctions,
since they require subjective evaluations which go beyond
the speech itself.
Obviously, a search for motives can be a difficult, if
not impossible task. As Judge Clark asked in Chrestensen:
[H]ow can we say that plaintiff's motives are only or
primarily financial? Is he just engaged in an adver
tising plot, or does he really believe in his wrongs?
We know how opposition to oppression, real or fan
cied, grows upon a person, and we can suspect that by
now, plaintiff regards himself as a crusader against
injustice.

. . . Indeed, we think it is a misconcep

tion of the great freedom here involved to hold it
more applicable to a group protest for abstract reli
gious or political principle than to individual pro
tests for concrete business injuries. Not such was
the attitude of the founding fathers; was it not
against a tax on tea that one of our most cherished
blows for freedom was struck? (516)
Judge Clark's observations raise another problem with
a motive-based definition —

that it is as overbroad as a

content-based definition is underinclusive. Many forms of
absolutely protected speech are presumably economically
motivated, from newspaper editorials to labor demonstra
tions. Certainly, one could argue that all the messages
examined in Chapter Four are motivated by a desire to
increase business at Nevada's legal brothels. Such a defi
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nition, then, does not offer a way to distinguish between
those messages that appear overtly commercial and the com
mentary contained in Figure Six, which recites factual
information and argues for the legalization of brothels in
other jurisdictions.
The editorial in Figure Six is also a good example of
how motivation is difficult to determine. One might argue
that the editorialist seeks to enhance the reputation of
legal brothels by pointing out their public health safety
record. On the other hand, it can also plausibly be argued
that the call for legalization of brothels in other juris
dictions, if heeded, could have a negative economic impact
on geographically remote Nevada houses of prostitution.
Thus, the claim could be made that the content of the edi
torial in Figure Six indicates its motive is to hurt
Nevada brothel business by seeking the legalization of
prostitution in more accessible locales.
Finally, a motive-based definition could lead to some
disturbing anomalies. The messages in Figures Five, Six
and Nine all mention public health and the safety record
of brothels. In the Figure Six editorial, these statements
are attributed to a Clark County Health Department offi
cial. A motive-based definition would allow some publica
tions to quote this official, but forbid the same quotes
if they were published by those with an economic interest
in brothels. By construing an underlying economic motive,
those who would regulate speech could forbid one speaker

the right to disseminate information to which others
enjoyed unfettered access. Motive, then, would determine
the overall level of First Amendment protection afforded
speakers, precisely the situation warned against by Jus
tice Douglas in his celebrated Dennis dissent:
The crime then depends not on what is taught, but on
who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech
turn not on what is s a i d , but on the intent with
which it is said. Once we start down that road we
enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every
citizen.

(583)

The Court's consideration of economic motive has not
been limited to the economic interests of the speaker. In
Central Huds o n , in which the Court fully restated the
commercial speech doctrine, commercial speech is defined
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience" (561). Such consideration of
readers' economic interests might call into question the
legal status of such messages as a November 1980 Cosmopo
litan magazine article, "Sex For Sale in Las Vegas." Pre
sumably, Cosmopolitan had no economic interest in Nevada
brothels. Without reaching the more problematic issue of
whether the magazine's economic interests were served by
publishing sexually titillating articles, thereby affect
ing classification of the piece, one can assume its gener
ally favorable description of a Pahrump brothel may well
have impacted the reader's economic interests. Indeed,
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because the article explicitly listed the sexual services
offered, under this definition it was, in the sense of
describing a specific economic transaction, more commer
cial than the brothel messages.
Such a definition, if the word "solely" were to be
given any consideration, might also be as underinclusive
as those which equate commercial speech with no more than
a proposal for an economic transaction. The use of the
word "solely" further underscores the notion that any
entertainment or political function served by the speech
removes it from the realm of the commercial.
One variation of motive-based distinctions which pur
ports to eliminate at least some of the troublesome sub
jectivity involved with discovering intent is commonly
called the "primary purpose test." Here, the message
itself is evaluated to determine the motivation behind its
dissemination. But the problem with using a primary pur
pose test to distinguish commercial from non-commercial
speech was pointed out as early as Chrestensen by Judge
Clark:
[A]t once we are faced by the question,

"How much is

primarily"? "Primarily" commercial presumably signi
fies a test quantitative in amount; a limited dross
of commercialism does not vitiate, though a more sub
stantial amount may, and presumably will . . . Plain
tiff's handbill furnishes a good example of the
uncertainty, not to speak of unreality, of the sug-
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gested distinctions.

(515-516).

A variation of the primary purpose test was suggested
by Nadir N. Tawil. Tawil claimed his definition lay
between the subjectivity of motive and the underinclusive
ness of content. But the definition — "commercial Speech
is an expression designed primarily to promote a commer
cial product, service, or a business interest" (1027)
— seems only a restatement of the primary purpose test and
is fraught with the same difficulties.

Such attempts to

separate primary from secondary motives are bound to fail,
Tribe observed, since communicators are likely to want to
both make money and convince others of the value of their
ideas. Protection cannot be limited to those with altruis
tic motives, Tribe wrote, because "it is unthinkable that
[F]irst [A]mendment protection should extend only to
saints." (892, n. 11)

Communication Context
Another commonsense distinction between commercial and
non-commercial speech is the context in which the message
appears. Although the Supreme Court has considered context
as a minor factor, if at all, it deserves examination, if
only to emphasize its shortcomings as a definitional com
ponent .
If considering context, one might be tempted to afford
greater protection to the messages appearing in Figures
One, Six and Eight because they appear in publications
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which conform to traditional notions of reputable media.
Panorama and Las Vegas After Dark are traditional maga
zines in the sense that they feature considerable edito
rial content dealing with a variety of subjects of pre
sumed interest to Nevada tourists. In contrast, the other
publications deal editorially only with brothels, while
the rest of the pages, those labelled "Paid Advertise
ment," also concern themselves with sexually-oriented
entertainment.
One must be careful, however, not give too much weight
to such considerations, for they simply add another defi
nitional problem to our inquiry: what constitutes "the
press?" Donald Lively has examined these difficulties in a
commercial context and has concluded, "The notion that a
publication must be evaluated to determine whether it is
part of the bona fide press is demonstrably dangerous"
(862). For the most part, the Court has wisely avoided
this issue. There is also the historical view, held by the
Court, that pamphlets and handbills, far from being nontraditional media,

"have been historic weapons in the

defense of liberty" (Lovell v. Griffin 452).

Combining the Components
The Court has also, on more than one occasion, com
bined the above-mentioned components into a single defini
tion. In Biaelow. the Court noted that "[t]he diverse
motives, means and messages of advertising may make speech
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'commercial' in widely varying degrees" (826).

This is

not particularly helpful, since the Court does not address
the issue of where the line should be drawn between pro
tection and permissible regulation. Even a cursory exami
nation of Nevada brothel messages reveals they contain
commercial elements in widely varying degrees, but this
observation does not help separate commercial from non
commercial speech.
In Bolaer. the Court looked for three factors, which,
when taken together, were determinative of commercial
speech: economic motivation, proposal to engage in an eco
nomic transaction, and reference to a specific product.
But combining these factors did not alleviate their indi
vidual shortcomings. Product reference and proposal to
engage in economic transaction do not remedy the intract
able problem of determining motivation.
Nor does this combination of factors help separate
commercial from non-commercial brothel messages. As
already noted, most of the brothel messages lack any spe
cific proposal to engage in economic transaction. Such a
definition then, is seriously underinclusive, since the
lack of any of its three parts means the speech in ques
tion in non-commercial.
Another combination of factors was advocated by Thomas
Merrill, who suggested the following three-part definition
of commercial speech:
(1) speech that refers to a specific brand name prod-
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uct or service,

(2) made by the speaker with a finan

cial interest in the sale of the advertised product
or service, or in the distribution of the speech,

(3)

that does not advertise an activity itself protected
by the [F]irst [A]mendment.

(236)

Neither of the subsidiary second and third prongs of
Merrill's definition need be discussed in detail at this
point. Prong two is a motive-based test, the shortcomings
of which have been discussed above. Prong three, which
will be incorporated into the definition proposed in this
thesis, will be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.
At first glance, Merrill's first prong, using specific
product reference as a definitional component of commer
cial speech, seems attractive. Like other message-based
factors, it offers an objective criterion for distinguish
ing commercial speech.

(Although that objectivity is

sacrificed in prong two, which perhaps Merrill feels com
pelled to add in order to save his definition from over
breadth. ) But while the initial objection to this is its
potential overbreadth (specific product reference would
categorize the above-mentioned Cosmopolitan article as
commercial speech and could also apply to consumer publi
cations) it also appears to be underinclusive. Only the
commentary in Figure Six makes no specific product refer
ence, but it would be easy enough to delete any reference
to a specific brothel in Figure Seven, the only message
whose status as an advertisement is not in dispute, with
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out substantively changing the message itself. Neither
does the third prong save Merrill's definition, since
speech which concerned an activity not itself protected,
like prostitution, would remain commercial, regardless of
the circumstances surrounding publication.

The Question of Harm
What is notably absent from any of the above defini
tions is an underlying justification for affording a
lesser standard of protection to commercial speech. And
while the Court has attempted to justify a lower position
in the hierarchy of First Amendment values, the Court has
never said commercial speech is per se harmful.
Simon claimed that this was a problem with prior defi
nitional attempts, arguing that,

"The notion that speech

may be regulated or prohibited without a showing of harm
is foreign to the spirit of [F]irst [A]mendment jurispru
dence" (232). Implicit, then, in Simon's argument is the
notion that for a separate category of "commercial" speech
to exist at all, such speech must somehow be harmful.
Simon suggested that rather than continue applying the
Central Hudson test, a test which allowed for the regula
tion of non-harmful speech, the harm of commercial speech
must be explicit in its definition (232). Such a defini
tion, according to Simon, would require the government to
show a causal link between advertising and the purported
harm. Thus, Simon's definition of commercial speech was:
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calculated expression in the form of advertising or
promotional material which is designed by the speaker
to affect consumer purchases on the basis of informa
tion or impressions contained therein resulting in
action which is harmful to individual consumers or
society as a whole.

(244)

Simon's definition stands apart from the others
because its use of the term "commercial speech" is unique.
Most advertisements would not be categorized as commercial
under the definition, unless specific harm could be shown.
A second troublesome aspect of Simon's definition is
that there is also the source of the harm to be consid
ered.

Would the state of Nevada, in attempting to control

brothel advertising, have to show merely that brothel mes
sages increased business at houses of ill repute? Or would
the state have to show that prostitution itself was harm
ful? Is speech itself ever harmful, or is it only the
action which the speech might engender which society ought
to prevent? These questions are implicitly raised by
Simon's definition, but never answered.
Simon's definition is inadequate because the answers
to these questions remain open to debate. Also open to
debate is his claim that "the effects of advertising can
be reasonably predicted" (240). Persuasion is at best a
murky science, and specific cause-effect relationships
between message and audience behavior are rarely, if ever,
quantifiable. Professor Don Pember noted that "there is
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little specific evidence, for example, that an advertising
campaign can foist unwanted products upon an unwilling
public. Evidence is also lacking that most advertising has
significant impact upon most consumer purchasing decisions
(Pember 56).
It is, of course, reasonable to argue that advertising
must work, otherwise advertisers would sooner or later
realize that their efforts were unsuccessful and discon
tinue them. But Simon's definition could well require that
courts decide questions of cause-and-effect better left to
scientists.
In addition, Simon's definition provides no reliable
way to distinguish between what he calls "advertising or
promotional material" and what those wishing to dissemi
nate brothel messages would undoubtedly call protected
editorial copy. One is still left to decide by some other
standard what exactly distinguishes commercial from non
commercial speech. What Simon has done then, is not to
define commercial speech, but suggest a new standard by
which commercial speech cases should be decided.
Finally, commercial speech is not the only form of
communication of which the Court has declared regulation
permissible without a specific showing of harm. Despite
continued controversy over the societal effects of obsce
nity, the Court continues to permit regulation, if not
suppression.
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The Speech/Action Nexus
Each of these definitions has its shortcomings. Messa
ge-based tests usually are underinclusive, and sometimes
overbroad; motive-based formulations are also generally or
so subjective as to be of little value. The primarypurpose test suffers similarly from the problems inherent
in determining intent. Neither does combining the factors
seem to take care of the difficulties encountered. If any
thing, such combinations seem only to exacerbate the defi
nitional problems, since rather than compensate for each
other, each definitional component retains its weaknesses.
On the other hand, some of the commonsense distinc
tions discussed in this chapter seem to offer help in
defining commercial speech, in that they attempt to iso
late some factor —

or combination of factors —

that make

commercial speech different from other forms of communica
tion.

Discussions of motivation, as well as Merrill's

emphasis on product reference, remind one that commercial
speech is characterized by an intended economic transac
tion. Message-based tests attempt to isolate some objec
tive indicator of this connection between commercial
speech and subsequent economic activity.
Several commentators have discerned this close rela
tionship. Rome and Roberts have commented that "commercial
speech is 'speech plus conduct'" (33). Although Simon
seemed to ignore the importance of persuasion in other
categories of speech when he observed that commercial
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speech "is the most intentional of all speech," it is cer
tainly true that commercial speech is always linked to an
intended economic transaction. It was Farber who offered
the best-developed analysis of the link between commercial
speech and economic action, when he discussed the contrac
tual elements of commercial speech. Farber noted that
"Similar to the language of a written contract, the lan
guage in advertising can be seen as constituting part of
the seller's commitment to the buyer" (387). After dis
missing economic motivation and subject matter as distin
guishing factors, Farber turns to the distinction that
"the commercial speaker not only talks about a product,
but also sells it" (386).
Such a reconception of commercial speech as speech
brigaded with economic action should appeal to those on
both sides of the advertising regulation issue. Those
opposed to regulation would likely agree that contracts,
either explicit or implied, ought not be protected by the
First Amendment. Those favoring regulation ought equally
to agree with Farber's observation that a "statute which
prohibits the showing the contract to consumers in advance
might raise [F]irst [A]mendment problems not unlike those
raised by a ban on advertising" (387 at n. 70). Although
this distinction does not seem to justify suppression of
commercial speech, it certainly serves to explain such
communication's lesser level of constitutional protection.
The contractual aspects of commercial speech should cer-

95

tainly be truthful and non-misleading.
However, Farber's reliance on implied contract is lim
iting. Surely, a contract between seller and buyer, either
implied or explicit, is only one form of the relationship
between commercial speech and economic action. An applica
tion of this contractual perspective to the brothel mes
sages will illustrate this point. The descriptions of
facilities in Figures One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, Eight
and Nine discuss a type of service available. A potential
customer can reasonably expect a given brothel to have a
large selection of girls, Japanese-style baths, a dungeon,
handicapped facilities and/or other services described in
the messages. Similarly, the health claims in Figures
Three, Six, Eight and Nine imply a contract: a customer
can expect that prostitutes working at a brothel have
recently been examined by a doctor.
But are these the only explicitly commercial elements
contained in the messages? The telephone numbers and maps
prominently featured in several messages seem one of their
most overtly commercial aspects. Indeed, as noted in Chap
ter One, NRS 201.430 specifically mentions the "location
or telephone number of a house of prostitution" as consti
tuting brothel advertising. It is not a contract that is
being implied, but a close connection of the type dis
cussed above that such maps and telephone numbers consti
tute.
Another way of defining this link would be as those
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elements of the message that enable the receiver of the
communication to follow through with the intended economic
transaction. William McGuire pointed out that an integral
part of the persuasive process is providing one's audience
with the skills necessary to put one's proposal into
effect. In the economic marketplace, this translates into
price or credit information and location and availability
of goods and/or services. These, then, are the connections
between economic speech and commercial activity. They are
the specific tools consumers need before consummating
transactions in the economic marketplace.
The recognition of this nexus as a distinguishing
characteristic of commercial speech implies net only a new
definition of commercial speech, but a reformulation of
the commercial speech doctrine. The final chapter of this
thesis will propose an heuristic definition of commercial
speech which, it is hoped, will bring such communication
into better alignment with other speech protected by the
First Amendment.
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CHAPTER SIX

A HEURISTIC DEFINITION

To view commercial speech as that speech which is
closely linked with an intended economic activity implies
a difference between economic speech in the abstract and
specific commercial exhortations. Constitutional scholars
will notice this distinction is similar to that difference
between advocacy of illegal activity as a general politi
cal doctrine and incitement to specific illegal acts, a
difference already recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Indeed, it is the central thrust of this thesis that if
such a standard is workable in the political marketplace,
it ought to be equally applicable to the economic market
place. The line between commercial and non-commercial
speech ought to be the line between abstract economic
ideas and specific economic incitements.
This chapter briefly reviews the development of the
above-mentioned standard in sedition cases and then pro
poses a heuristic definition of commercial speech sug
gested by the concepts articulated in these cases. It must
be emphasized that this definition is intended as an edu
cational tool; while it is hoped that the definition pro
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vides insight into the nature of commercial speech, it
does not operationalize the concept of such expression.
Both the shortcomings and the advantages of the proposed
definition will become clearer when it is applied to the
brothel messages that have already been examined.
The distinction between abstract advocacy and specific
incitement was first proposed by Judge Learned Hand in
Masses Publishing v. Patton in 1917. After Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes advanced the "clear and present danger"
test in Schenck v. United States in 1919, Hand complained
in a letter to civil liberties lawyer Walter Nells that he
doubted his standard would ever be recognized as law (Gun
ther 750). But Masses has indeed become an accepted stan
dard in such cases. By 1969, when the Court decided Bran
denburg v. O h i o . Hand's Masses standard had become what
Gerald Gunther called "a central theme" in sedition cases
and an accepted part of constitutional law (722).

The per

curiam opinion in Brandenburg stressed that the law "must
observe the established distinction between mere advocacy
and incitement to imminent lawless action" (449).
At the time when Hand wrote his Masses opinion, it was
customary to view seditious speech cases in terms of the
potential effects of such communication:
[P]unishability of speech turned on its probable
effect or tendency, on assessments of causation and
consequences; talk of the 'natural and reasonable
effect of the publication' was a characteristic way
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of framing the question.

(Gunther 724)

Such a standard disturbed Hand, who sought a more
"absolute and objective test" (Gunther 725). In Masses.
Hand had the chance to attempt to articulate such a stan
dard.
In his opinion in the district court case, Hand
granted an injunction against the New York postmaster to
the publishers of The M a sses. a journal which opposed
United States involvement in World War One. The postmaster
had declared The Masses non-mailable as a seditious
publication because it aroused opposition to the draft
law. Hand ruled that it was not enough that the indirect
effect of the publication might be draft resistance: "If
one stops short of urging upon others that it is their
duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me
that it should not be held to have attempted to cause its
violation" (540). Although Hand recognized it was possible
to persuade through indirect means, he argued that any
lesser standard would "involve necessarily as a
consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and
of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the
existing policies" (539-540).
The Masses standard began to be incorporated into the
Supreme Court's mainstream thinking in two opinions
authored by Justice John Marshall Harlan. Yates v. United
States and Scales v. United States involved the prosecu
tion under the Smith Act of officers of the Communist
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Party. In Ya t e s . decided in 1957, Harlan accepted a
defense argument that the jury should have been instructed
that the government had an obligation to prove the defen
dants advocated unlawful action, not just abstract doc
trine. And in Scales. decided in 1961, the Court again
overturned the conviction of a communist leader on the
grounds that no party member could be convicted as long as
the organization advocated only abstract doctrine.
Finally, in Brandenburg. the Court combined the notion
of harm implicit in Holmes' clear and present danger test
with the Masses distinction between incitement and
abstract doctrine. Since, as has already been discussed,
harm is not an issue in commercial speech cases, the clear
and present danger test is of little value to such cases.
But the Masses standard, with its focus on message rather
than effect, seems a well-suited tool for helping to dis
tinguish between commercial and non-commercial expression.
With these distinctions in mind, then, the following
heuristic definition is proposed: Commercial speech is
that communication which incites its audience to engage in
a specific economic transaction which itself may be con
stitutionally regulated. Indicators of such incitement
include specific product reference, price advertising,
implicit or explicit contracts, or other information which
facilitates the intended transaction.
Seeking such indicators of economic incitement seems a
better approach than a subjective search for motive. It
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certainly seems in line with Hand's call for a test focus
ing on the speaker's words (Gunther 721). The incitement
standard is also superior to the primary purpose test in
that it does not require that distinctions be made between
primary and secondary motives; "objective" evidence of
incitement in the speech itself is enough to classify the
communication as commercial, regardless of the speaker's
motivation.
In addition, commercial messages which deal with acti
vities which are themselves constitutionally protected —
abortion, religion and labor activism, to name but a few
—

would also enjoy constitutional protection. Of course,

the contractual aspects of such expression, such things as
price advertising and specific product claims, would have
to remain truthful and non-misleading. This would replace
the subjective "public interest" qualification currently
used by the Court to grant protection to some commercial
speech with an objective standard that could be applied to
all expression. This standard also seems to fit well with
the most current formulation of commercial speech doctrine
represented by Posadas.
This definition would also help avoid the problem of
overbreadth when dealing with consumer publications and
other correctly protected forms of expression, since such
publications lack that close relationship between message
and economic activity. Although they contain specific
price and product reference, they lack the incitement to

10 2

engage in a specific economic activity that characterizes
commercial speech.

Applying the Definition
The advantages, as well as the shortcomings of this
new definition of commercial speech can be illustrated by
applying it to Nevada brothel messages with consistent
results. The message in Figure One, taken as a whole, is
commercial since it contains several direct links between
message and action. The mention of a specific brothel,
though not a distinguishing feature if considered by
itself, is coupled with the notation "We accept Visa and
Master Charge," providing consumers with the notion of
where they can get the product and how they can pay for
it. The map to the Chicken Ranch further provides access
to economic activity, as does the phone number and nota
tion that limousine service is available.
That the message is displayed as an "example" used to
illustrate an article on the Princess Sea Industries case
does not save it from being commercial. The Figure One
"example" is actually a mixture of commercial and non
commercial elements, and under the definition any economic
incitement renders the entire message commercial speech.
As Barnes pointed out, "So long as the Court retains a
separate commercial speech category, mixed messages must
inevitably be classified as commercial speech" (485). But
if mixed messages are invariably classified as commercial,
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this in no way threatens protected speech, since speakers
always have the option of removing those commercial ele
ments which the state may regulate.
Although mixed messages would be considered commercial
in their entirety, it will illustrate the workings of the
proposed definition if we examine individual elements of
the brothel messages under discussion. The message in Fig
ure Two, for instance, would be classified commercial,
since it is a mixture of commercial and non-commercial
elements. But if the maps and phone numbers which incite
economic activity were removed, what remained —

the phys

ical description of the Chicken Ranch and its "ladies"
— would not be considered commercial speech.

Similarly,

most of the message in Figure Three would be protected
under the proposed definition, with the exception of maps
and phone numbers.
A further example of the kind of line-drawing the def
inition would facilitate is provided by a comparison of
two similar paragraphs contained in Figures Three and
Four.

Protected under the definition would be the para

graph in Figure Three which reads "The Cherry Patch, a
mere 21 miles from the Clark County line, is perhaps the
closest and perhaps the easiest of all Nevada's legal
brothels to find. It's about an hour's drive from the cen
ter of Las Vegas." This description of the location lacks
the link necessary to render the speech commercial in that
it is insufficient information with which to actually find
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the brothel. In contrast, in addition to the maps and
phone numbers in Figure Four, three paragraphs (beginning
with "From the Strip, take Interstate 15") contain infor
mation specific enough to constitute a close relationship
between message and the consummation of economic activity.
The message in Figure Six would be fully protected,
since it contains no close relationship between speech and
economic activity. Figure Seven, on the other hand, could
be suppressed, under NRS 201.430, without endangering pro
tected speech. Like Figure Five, Figure Nine contains
information specific enough to be considered purely com
mercial; otherwise it would be protected. Finally, Figure
Nine would be protected speech, with the exception of the
phone number provided for further information. Although it
advocates a visit to Sheri's Ranch, it lacks specific
incitement and provision of directions to get there.

Conclusion
Some readers may be troubled by the fact that the pro
posed definition allows for the regulation of truthful
information concerning the location of legal Nevada broth
els. But such power seems inescapable under the Court's
current formulation of the commercial speech doctrine, as
articulated in Posadas. Since the state can outlaw prosti
tution entirely, it may regulate commercial speech con
cerning prostitution as well. Chicken Ranch owner Russell
Reade wrote that "a large number of male tourists who
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visit Las Vegas . . . are interested in utilizing the ser
vices of a prostitute. Nevada wisely, discreetly and
quietly offers a legal alternative" (Review Journal 11B).
NRS 201.430 allows the state a constitutional means to
ensure its brothel industry remains quiet and discreet. It
is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest the level of
protection that ought to be afforded commercial speech.
That is for other commentators to argue and finally for
the Court to decide.
It is also important to remember that this definition
is offered only as a first step toward resolving the dif
ficult problem of distinguishing commercial from non
commercial speech. Problems remain. In Chapter Five, it
was stated that commerciality went beyond implied or spe
cific contracts. Yet it is entirely possible to craft a
hypothetical message which contains the remaining specific
indicators of economic incitement listed —

specific prod

uct reference, price advertising, and other information
that facilitates an economic transaction —

which intuit

ively seems to be non-commercial speech. The announcement
of a protest to take place at a Nevada brothel, for
instance, might include maps, phone numbers and even the
observation that the business in question accepts credit
cards, without being an incitement to engage the services
of a prostitute.
However, such a hypothetical example does not neces
sarily indict the conceptual value of the definition. The

106

notion that there is a substantive difference between
abstract economic thought and specific economic incitement
—

and that this difference is at the heart of the commer

cial speech problem —

is still valid. What the example

does suggest is it is necessary to better identify the
indicators of incitement before a truly operational defi
nition of commercial speech is possible.
Another limitation of this study is that to replace
"intent" with "incitement" does not obviate the need to
draw an arbitrary, quite possibly subjective line between
what is deemed abstract economic discussion and specific
economic incitement. But at least the definition replaces
the subjective search for motive with a somewhat more
objective examination of potentially commercial messages
themselves.

And it is not a presumed intent on which the

matter of constitutional protection turns, but rather the
advertisement itself, giving communicators fair notice as
to what is likely to constitute commercial speech.

Still,

it will require further study before the distinctions
between intent and incitement are fully clarified.
In keeping with this emphasis on objective, rather
than subjective indicators, the function of communication
context in distinguishing commercial from non-commercial
speech must also be more fully addressed. In Chapter Five
it was pointed out that communication context added defi
nitional difficulties to this inquiry, since it required,
at the very least, that one distinguish the press from
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other forms of media. However, a consideration of communi
cation context seems inevitable to prevent the definition
from reaching communication which intuitively seems non
commercial. This thesis, for instance, contains those
indicators of commercial speech identified in the brothel
messages. What keeps the thesis from being categorized as
commercial itself is the larger context of scholarship in
which it is presented. The same is true of consumer publi
cations. It has already been stated that such publications
lack incitement, but the reason they lack incitement has
more to do with the context in which they present informa
tion rather than with the presence or absence of any spe
cific indicators. Under the definition, mixed speech
— those messages which contain economic messages in a con
text which does not suggest they are anything but commer
cial —

would, as previously noted, always be categorized

as commercial. But the inclusion of commercial indicators
within a larger context does not necessarily mean even
those portions of the speech containing those indicators
should be labelled commercial. Operationalizing this
notion of context will be necessary before the definition
can be applied beyond brothel messages with any consis
tency .
Application of the definition beyond the examples dis
cussed in this thesis would be the next step in arriving
at a more reliable way to distinguish between commercial
and non-commercial speech.

At this point, however, fur
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ther problems would present themselves. Many modern adver
tising messages appear to fall outside the definition as
proposed; they seem to lack the specific product identifi
cation or incitement to imminent economic activity to jus
tify their regulation. It can be argued that economic
self-interest mitigates against the widespread use of such
advertising as a way to circumvent regulation, but "image"
advertising remains a popular tool in the economic market
place.
The more abstract nature of image advertising may mean
such messages would never be considered commercial under
the definition. But in a sense, these messages are unlike
more traditional forms of advertising and perhaps should
be entitled to a different level of constitutional protec
tion.
It is the philosophical position of the author of this
thesis that until such time as these problems can be
resolved, it is better that some speech which might other
wise be undeserving of protection escape regulation than
to risk the possibility of controlling speech which ought
to be protected. The major limitation of the proposed def
inition seems to be that it is too narrow rather than too
broad. But in the sensitive area of First Amendment
issues, perhaps this should be seen as an advantage rather
than a liability.
Finally, what makes the proposed definition valuable
conceptually despite its many limitations is its potential
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for bringing together theorists of divergent perspectives
and for bringing commercial speech itself within the
,,mainstream,, of the First Amendment.
Those who favor limiting commercial speech protection
need not worry that economic due process is being revived;
the power of the government to regulate economic activity
and speech closely linked with such activity is not
threatened. Nor should those who worry about undue sup
pression of protected speech have cause for concern. The
proposed definition would protect precisely that kind of
economic speech jurists and commentators have been worried
about chilling. That concern has not been over the consti
tutional status of price advertising so much as it has
been over the possible suppression of other, more general
economic speech which might be categorized as commercial.
When Justice Blackmun wrote that he saw no need to force
the hypothetical druggist in Virginia Board of Pharmacy to
cast himself as a commentator on drug prices, he missed
the point. It is commentary on drug prices, not the cost
of the compounds themselves, which is beyond the legisla
tive power of the state. Forcing the hypothetical druggist
to discuss drug prices in the abstract puts the kind of
speech in the marketplace that the Court has been eager to
protect. Tribe has observed that "The entire commercial
speech doctrine . . . represents an accommodation between
the right to speak and hear about goods and services and
the right of government to regulate the sale of. such goods
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and services" (903). The proposed definition allows for
just that sort of accommodation.
The definition moves the commercial speech doctrine
from what Tribe has called the "makeshift . . .
unsteady"

and

(904) foundation of the case law we have

examined in Chapter Two, to the stable and well-evolved
doctrine which produced Brandenburg. Perhaps because of
the Meiklejohnian bias shown toward political speech on
the part of so many scholars and jurists, the problem of
reconciling free speech and advocacy of illegal activity
in the political realm has received considerable atten
tion. The result is a well-articulated body of case law
which serves as a reliable analytical tool with which to
deal with future cases. That same analytical framework
could be employed in commercial speech cases by adopting
the proposed definition. After all, if the safety of the
republic can be entrusted to the principles embodied in
Brandenburg. then certainly these same precepts should
ensure the integrity of the economic marketplace.

Ill

APPENDIX A
244.345. D a n c in g h a lls, e s c o rt se rv ic e s a n d g am b lin g g am es o r d e v ic e s:
L ice n sin g a n d re g u la tio n ; lic e n sin g h o u se s o f p r o s titu tio n
p ro h ib ite d in c e rta in co m itie s.
1. E very natu ral person, firm, association of persons or corporation w ishing
engage in the business of conducting a dancing hall, escort service, or
gam bling gam e or device perm itted by law, outside of an incorporated city,
m ust:
(a) M ake application to the license board of the county in w hich th e
business is to be engaged in, for a county license of the kind desired. T he
application m ust be in a form prescribed by the regulations of th e license
board.
(b) F ile the application w ith the required license fee w ith th e county
license collector, as provided in chapter 364 of NRS, who shall p re sen t th e
application to the license board a t its next re g u la r m eeting.
T he board, in counties having a population of less th a n 250,000, m ay re fer th e
petition to the sheriff, who shall report upon it a t the following re g u la r
m eeting of th e board. In counties having a population of 250,000 or m ore, th e
board shall refer the petition to th e m etropolitan police departm ent. T he
d e p a rtm e n t shall conduct an investigation re la tin g to the petition and report
its findings to the board a t the board’s next re g u la r meeting. The board shall
a t th a t m eeting g ra n t or refuse the license prayed for or enter any o th er order
con sistent w ith its regulations. Except in th e case of an application for a
license to conduct a gam bling gam e or device, th e county license collector m ay
g ra n t a tem porary perm it to an applicant, valid only until the next re g u la r
m eeting of th e board. In unincorporated tow ns an d cities governed u n d er th e
provisions of chapter 269 of NRS, th e license board has the exclusive power to
license, a n d regulate th e businesses m entioned in th is subsection.
2. T he board of county commissioners, an d in counties having a population
of less th a n 250,000, th e sheriff of th a t county constitute the license board,
an d th e county clerk or other person designated by the license board is th e
clerk thereof, in th e respective counties of th is state.
3. T he license board may, w ithout fu rth e r com pensation to the board or its
clerk:
(a) F ix, impose and collect license fees upon th e businesses m entioned in
th is section.
(b) G ra n t or deny applications for licenses and impose conditions,
lim itatio n s an d restrictions upon th e licensee.
(c) Adopt, am end and repeal regulations relating to licenses and li
censees.
(d) R estrict, revoke or suspend licenses for cause after hearing. In a n
em ergency th e board may issue a n order for im m ediate suspension or
lim ita tio n of a license, b u t the order m u st s ta te th e reason for suspension or
lim itatio n an d afford th e licensee a hearing.
4. T he license board shall hold a h ea rin g before adopting proposed
reg u latio n s, before adopting am endm ents to regulations, and before repealing
reg u latio n s re la tin g to the control or th e licensing of th e businesses
m entioned in th is section. Notice of th e h ea rin g m ust be published in a
:o

new spaper published and having general circulation in the county a t least
once a week for a period of 2 weeks before the hearing.
5. Upon adoption of new regulations th e board shall designate th e ir
effective date, w hich m ay not be earlier th a n 15 days after th eir adoption.
Im m ediately after adoption a copy of any new regulations m ust be available
for public inspection during regular business hours a t the office of the county
clerk.
6. A m ajority vote of th e m em bers of the license board present governs in
th e tran saction of all business. A m ajority of the m embers constitutes a
quorum for th e tran sactio n of business.
7. Any n a tu ra l person, firm , association of persons or corporation who
engages in any of th e businesses m entioned in th is section w ithout first
h av in g obtained th e license and paid the license fee as provided in this section
is g u ilty of a m isdem eanor.
8. In a county hav in g a population of 250,000 or more, the license board
sh all not g ra n t any license to a petitioner for th e purpose of operating a house
of ill fame or rep u te or any other business em ploying any person for th e
purpose of prostitution. (1923, pp. 62, 63; CL 1929, §§ 2037 — 2040; 1959, p.
838; 1961, p. 364; 1971, p. 11; 1973, p. 923; 1975, p. 562; 1979, pp. 20, 511, 728,
730, 732, 733.)
CroM referencee. — As to location of
houses of ill fame, see NRS 201.380.
CASE NOTES
Houses of prostitution no longer constitute a nuisance per ae. - Subsection 8 of this
section, when read in coqunction with subsection 1, manifest! a statutory licensing scheme
for houses of prostitution outside of incorporated cities and towns, and this licensing
scheme is repugnant to and, by plain and
necessary implication, repeals the common-law
rule that a house of prostitutionconatitutei a
nuisance per se. Nye County v. Plenkmton, 94
Nev. 739,587 P.2d 421 (1978).
Counties may ban prostitution. - The
electorate of the county, through the exercise
of their prerogative to initiate county ordinances by initiative and referendum, have the
power to ban aU brothels; with but the one

Prostitution on an Indian reservation. —
The Secretary of Interior’s decision to rescind a
tribal ordinance which would have permitted
* ___ - _..
T ..
"oua**
prostitution on an Indian reserva*
tlon» on “*• grounds that prostitution is
frowned upon by federal policy and the licenaing of prostitution on a reservation would
bring about a political reaction advene to the
.
...
arb,tf ^ r,and “ Pn«ous
®v*n though prostitution is legal in parts of the
*hte and is a profitable economic enterprise,
Moepa Band of Paiute Indiana v. United States
Dep’t of Interior. 747 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1984).
Cited in: Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v. State,

ssr*n34£.,SS2*»hi.% *
a m d l b o a t h l q u a S T u , ih . a w u i a

EoUrajnni.nt, I"'. * Clark County Liquor h
but dsmsiwfa H m .ing in counties where Gaming Licensing Bd., 99 Nev. 811, 672 P.2d
brothels are allowed. Kuban v. McGimaey, 96 434 (1983); EDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 P.
Nev. 105,605 P.2d 623 (1980).
Supp. 1402.(0. Nev. 1984).
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201.430. Unlawful advertising of houses of prostitution.
1. It is unlaw ful for any owner, operator, agent or em ployee of a house of
prostitution, or anyone acting on behalf of any such person, to advertise any
house of prostitution:
(a) In any public th eater, on the public streets of any city o r town, or on
any public highw ay; or
(b) Any w here in any county, city or town w here p ro stitu tio n is
prohibited by local ordinance or where th e licensing of a house of
prostitution is prohibited by sta te statute.
2. Inclusion in a n y display, handbill or publication of th e address, location
or telephone n u m b er of a house of prostitution or of identification of a m eans
o f tran sp o rta tio n to such a house, or of directions tellin g how to obtain any
such inform ation, constitutes prim a facie evidence o f ad v e rtisin g for the
purposes of th is section.
3. Any person, com pany, association or.corporation violating th e provisionsof th is section sh a ll be punished:
(a> For th e f irs t offense, by a fine of not more th a n $500.
(b)
F or an y su b sequent offense, for a m isdem eanor. (1913, p. 135; RL
1912 (1919 Supp.), § 1, p. 3379; CL 1929, § 10535; 1967, p. 481; 1979, pp.
305,604.)
CASE NOTES
Constitutionality. — This section and NRS
201.440 do not clearly contravene constitutiona! principles as thus far articulated by the
United States Supreme Court. Princess Sea
Indus., Inc. v. State, 97 Nev. 534,638 P.2d 281
(1981).

Prostitution is an activity which this
itate may choose either to regulate or to
prohibit entirely. Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v.
State*97 Nev-534' 635 P2d 281 (1981).

201.440. Unlawful to permit illegal advertising of houses of prostitu
tion.
Any person, com pany, association or corporation who know ingly allows any
owner, operator, a g e n t or employee of a house of prostitution, or anyone acting
on b eh a lf of any such person, to advertise a house of p ro stitu tio n in his place
of business shall be punished:
1. F or th e first offense, by a fine of not more th an $500.
2. F or any sub seq u en t offense, for a misdemeanor. (1913, p. 136; RL 1912
(1919 Supp.), § 2, p. 3379; CL 1929, § 10536; 1967, p. 481; 1979, pp. 305,
605.)
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